

Realist or Liberal? Canadian Foreign Policy in the 1970s¹

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Abstract

The realist/liberal internationalist debate in international relations has been on-going in the modern era dating back to Carr and existed in earlier eras in less explicit terms. This research contributes to the long-standing debate by examining Canadian foreign policy in the 1970s. Canada's behavior is often associated with liberal internationalism. Two sets of hypotheses based on realism and liberalism are developed to test if the standard appraisal of Canadian foreign policy is accurate. Drawing on the cases listed on the Canadian government's own "Historic Timeline," this research finds that although greater support exists for the notion that Canada acted along the lines of theoretical liberalism, realism can also help explain significant Canadian activities. In fact, Realism performs well in cases of high politics. These findings suggest that portraying Canadian foreign policy in broad and sweeping liberal terms may be a misrepresentation or simplification of the reality of this volatile decade.

Canada's so-called liberal internationalist values have hardly been liberal, or even liberal. There is a tradition underlying the philosophy of Canadian external relations, but it is one derived primarily...from the values of conservatism.

Peace, Order, and Good Government

It has too often been too easy for rulers and governments to incite man to war.

Lester Pearson²

Canadian liberal internationalism has been touted as ideologically dominant over the decades (Munton and Keating 2001). For many, participation in UN peacekeeping is seen as an essential element of Canadian national identity (Massie 2016, 55). Canadians have tended to see their foreign policy through the lens of human rather than national security (James 2012, 16). Often highlighting the foreign policy decision-making of Prime Ministers St. Laurent and Pearson as the pinnacle of "good international citizenship" (Nossal 1998-1999), the discussions frequently revolve around the depth of belief in or support for liberal internationalism or whether this Canadian foreign policy perspective is in decline (Munton and Keating 2001; Nossal and Sarson 2014). The portrayal of inherent liberalism in Canadian foreign policy raises important questions. How accurate a depiction is this representation of Canadian foreign policy? Is this more the musings of proud internationalist Canadian scholars than an accurate presentation of reality? Are there other potential theoretical explanations for Canadian foreign policy behavior? How consistent has Canadian foreign policy been over time? Has Canada achieved a level of foreign policy independence in spite of the long shadow of American power (for discussion, see Bow and Lennox 2009; Clarkson 1968, 2002) or is Canada better seen as a partner to the United States (see Doran 1984)?

This research seeks to address these questions by assessing how well liberalism and realism help explain Canadian foreign policy in the 1970s. Realism and liberalism are theoretical

standard bearers in the international relations field (IR) and should therefore be tested regarding their effectiveness in explaining state behavior. The conventional wisdom is that Canadian foreign policy is profoundly liberal in orientation, yet not all agree with this conclusion. Some Canadian scholars argue that Canadian foreign policy leans towards realism (Stairs 2003; Lagassé and Robinson 2008). Others contend that there has been a tug and pull between the two perspectives over time shaped by political actors and international developments which influence Canadian foreign policy (Gottlieb 2004). Hence this research is engaging in an existing theoretical dialogue.

The focus on the 1970s puts Pierre Trudeau, Prime Minister for the majority of the decade, front and center. Trudeau notably sought to distance Canadian foreign policy from Pearsonianism and move towards a greater emphasis on Canadian national interests exemplified by the reduced commitment to NATO. Doran (1983) laments the drift from interdependence during this period to a more competition-based realism. On the other hand, Trudeau ended his time in office by seeking international consensus on superpower arms control. The shifts in emphasis over time during the Trudeau years, called a *Pirouette* by Granatstein and Bothwell (1990), suggest influence from both realism and liberalism. The 1970s, therefore, are an excellent test decade for assessing the applicability of these competing theories. Moreover, the decade fits well with the goal of assessing the nature of Canadian foreign policy writ large considering the lasting impact Trudeau has had on Canada. Accordingly, the findings here may very well be an indication of Canadian tendencies beyond this tumultuous decade. Such trajectories are of particular significance considering the broad-ranging and voluminous debates about shifts and evolutions in Canadian foreign policy in the post-9/11 era.

The article begins by reviewing both realist and liberal internationalist theory. Hypotheses are developed for each theory that enables comparison based on their contrasting expectations. The methods applied here are then outlined. The ensuing section reviews 12 cases of Canadian foreign policy behavior in the 1970s. Special attention is paid to instances of “high politics.” The findings here suggest that liberalism does well in explaining a broad array of Canadian behavior. In cases of high politics, however, realism is a better fit than liberalism. The implications of this research are that Canadian foreign policy is more complex than is often suggested and that both liberalism and realism have utility in the case of Canada.

Realism

The primary foci of realist theories are issues of war and peace, the impact of anarchy on state behavior, and the conflictual nature of international relations. At the heart of such approaches are state capacities in terms of hard or coercive power, in particular military power. Classical realist thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes, E.H Carr, and Hans Morgenthau present a pessimistic view of international interactions with emphases on a human lust for power, anarchy, self-helping states seeking to maximize their power relative to their counterparts to guarantee state survival/sovereignty, and balance of power. Cooperation, on the other hand, is seen as counter to the natural behavior and motivations of states and, when practiced, naïve, idealistic, and an example of romanticism (Carr 1946; Gottlieb 2004). From the realist viewpoint, peace is attained through deterrence brought on by the symmetrical balancing of great powers rather than the development of interstate trust or idealistic international values. Kenneth Waltz, the father of neo-realism, moved in a rationalist direction while maintaining the general, power-based principles of classical realism. Waltz (1979, 88-93) emphasized international structure based on what he called ordering principles. From this perspective, the basis for international order in an

an anarchic world is comparative state power where the most powerful states establish international patterns of behavior as they seek to increase their power and influence. Therefore, the toughest kids on the block establish the international structures that influence how all states behave. The international pecking order is crucial, as those who can help themselves do so, while those that cannot abide by the demands and strength of the powerful. Harknett and Yalcin (2012) capture the two essential independent variables inherent in realism, namely the survival motivation and the distribution of power.

Overall, realism is more a set of similarly focused theories than a tightly organized doctrine. Although some realist presentations are dogmatic (see Mearsheimer 1995; Keohane and Martin 1995), the theoretical system that is realism has assumptions and suppositions that have allowed for theoretical variation. The impact of Waltz's (1979) work in establishing *neo*-realism sent shock waves through international relations academia and, for some time, constrained realism within a set of theoretical parameters. In the last few decades, however, realists have thrown off Waltz's shackles (see Glaser 1994/1995; Schweller 1997; Scheuerman 2009) with some returning to less structured but more flexible propositions found in classical realism exemplified by the work of Hans Morgenthau. Neoclassical realism has added unit-level intervening variables to capture non-structural, domestic forces that influence state behavior (Brooks 1997; Taliaferro 2006; Kaarbo 2015; Massie 2016). This theoretical broadening allows for the inclusion of a greater range of variables within theoretical reasoning. One such variable, as discussed below, is economics. Inspired by the theoretical evolution of realism, this research draws upon both classical and neo-realism logic to develop hypotheses.

Although not a realist, *power transition* theorist A.F.K. Organski (1958) divided states into four categories: superpowers, great powers, middle powers, and small powers—a typology

that has been employed by realists for their theoretical constructs. Realist emphasis on power and its impact on international order or outcomes naturally lead to a greater focus on super—or great powers. After all, if middle and small powers do not influence international behaviors very much, paying much attention to them diverts one from what matters most. Canada is frequently seen as an archetypal middle power (see Cooper 2011). Hence, realism, neo-realism in particular, would be less-than-interested in Canada. However, Escudé (1988, 1989; cited in Giacalone 2012) developed the concept of peripheral realism to explain behaviors of “lesser” states. A primary focus of peripheral realism is that weaker states will emphasize internal economic development as a means to maintain state autonomy (see Giacalone 2012). In other words, economics can have a significant role in realist theory. Therefore, simply because structural realists would be inclined to ignore Canada does not mean realist theory cannot be applied to the case. Accordingly, this research develops realist hypotheses to assess the theory’s applicability to Canadian foreign policy behavior.

Realist Expectations for Canada

Although Canada must deal with the international structures developed by the super or great powers, that does not mean that Canada will not seek to help itself within these parameters. Realist scholars have spilled a great deal of ink about how states “balance” through the creation of alliances to help maintain or enhance their position in the international arena. In other words, states will make alliances with other states that match the relative power of threatening or potential enemy states and their potential alliances to deter such states from attacking them. Moreover, such efforts are in-line with the survival motivation. This independent variable, however, can have alternative manifestations than just state alignment. Therefore, all techniques designed to enhance state sovereignty must also be included to incorporate both the survival

motivation and the issues of distribution of power (see Harknett and Yalcin 2012). Accordingly, the first realist hypothesis (RH) focuses on balancing and sovereignty:

Realist Hypothesis (RH) 1: Canada, in general, will take steps to guarantee state survival and hence protect a fundamental level of state sovereignty. Accordingly, Canada will align itself with allies powerful enough to deter attacks from threatening or potential enemy states.

In addition to balancing, realist scholars have also investigated bandwagoning.

Bandwagoning can be defined as instances when middle or small powers align themselves with super or great powers to avoid being targeted by such states or to obtain some form of gain or profit. In the first instance, less powerful states will align themselves with threatening states to avoid being in the crosshairs of the powerful state (See Walt 1987). An example of this behavior is when Hungary joined the Axis alliance to avoid being invaded by Nazi Germany. In the latter case, less powerful states align with more powerful states with “the expectation of profit and easy gains” (Schweller 1997, 928). For example, Poland joined the Coalition of the Willing for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 with hopes of receiving increased foreign aid and connections with the United States and winning contracts in Iraq. In the case of Canada, alignment with the United States can be seen as a form of bandwagoning. Cooperating with the U.S. can prevent drawing the ire of America while at the same time facilitating trade which greatly benefits Canada.³

Moreover, because the international system is seen as fundamentally anarchic from the realist perspective, Canada would be expected to pursue self-help through unilateralist means. Bilateral techniques would also have a role in foreign policy as a means of achieving self-interested gains. Even in cases when alliances play a role in foreign policy, the ultimate goal

would be to serve narrow Canadian self-interest rather than loftier, ethically-based, systemic gains. This research, therefore, investigates the following realist hypotheses:

RH 2: Canada will align itself with powerful states or pursue bilateral policies in order to achieve profits or easy gains.

RH 3: Canada will pursue unilateral, self-help oriented bilateral or military alliance-based strategies rather than ethically-oriented bilateral or internationalist (multilateral), non-military alliance, IGO approaches.⁴

Finally, the importance of economics in issues of “high politics,” often raised by liberals, has been neglected by some realists (see Waltz 1979). Significant economic events, however, have led some realists to acknowledge that economics can join issues of war and peace within the realm of high politics. For instance, Henry Kissinger came to such a conclusion after the experience of the 1973 Oil Embargo (Kissinger 1979). Applying realist logic to economics, one would expect states to focus on the promotion of their own economic success. In fact, states will seek economic gains in relative terms compared to other states. In other words, states will try to patriate profits to enhance their economic power. Hence, realist economics are intrinsically mercantilist in nature. Accordingly, Canada should show little interest in providing foreign aid assistance to less developed countries except when seeking to open markets for Canadian businesses. From this perspective, one would expect Canada to promote Canadian businesses. With this in mind, the last of the realist hypotheses applies to economic behavior:

RH 4: Canada will pursue economic policies that promote Canadian macroeconomic and/or business’s interests, even at the expense of other state’s economic fortunes.

RH 5: Canada will offer foreign aid assistance to less developed countries primarily as a means to increase access to foreign markets.

RH 6: Canada will promote/champion Canadian companies.

The hypotheses focus on three primary exigencies of realism: 1) state survival; 2) sovereignty; and 3) self-interest/relative gains. These themes are specified in the six hypotheses to hone in on specific aspects of realism and provide multiple windows to this school of thought. Moreover, the realist hypotheses correspond with the liberal hypotheses outlined below to facilitate comparative analysis.

Liberalism/Liberal Institutionalism

Liberalism is a term that has a myriad of applications. When applied to international behavior, however, there are clear and consistent characteristics regarding the meaning of the term. Liberals do not deny that conflict is a part of international relations and that hard power issues are baseline features of international structures (see Keohane and Nye 2001). Liberals, however, see a much greater potential for cooperation than realists (Axelrod 1981; Axelrod 1984; Keohane 1984; Keohane and Nye 2001). As Rourke and Boyer note, “[L]iberals argue that foreign policy should be and sometimes is formulated according to the standards of cooperation and even altruism” (2010, 20).

Although beliefs can matter, it is important to note that one aspect of the reasoning behind the emphasis on cooperation is rationalism rather than, as Carr (2001) frames it, idealism. In other words, states decide to cooperate to achieve self-interested rather than normative and belief-driven ends. Axelrod (1984) and Keohane (1984) outline the logic behind how states learn that cooperation is in their egoistic interests through an iterative tit-for-tat. Realists, neo-realists in particular, often see each interaction as essentially ahistorically new. States assume that other states will take advantage of them if it is in that state’s self-interest. Axelrod argues that relying on single interactions neglects state-learning that occurs through repeated interactions. He

contends that over time, states will learn that cooperation will lead to greater pay-offs for both sides. Mutual interests, therefore, serve as a means to motivate cooperative/ethical behaviors. Moreover, this shared history can help develop trust between states. By ignoring the fact that states have long-term understanding of other states based on a history of interactions, a history which affects whether another state can be trusted or not, realists fail to see the importance of cooperation and trust and hence come to overly pessimistic conclusions. In other words, cooperation and ethics contribute to a state's self-interest. Moreover, the costs of conflict in blood and treasure further reinforce the potential gains of cooperation.

Liberal Expectations for Canada

From the liberal perspective, ethics matter. If a state acts unethically, other states will trust that state less and cooperate with it less. Therefore, states that act unethically pay a price. States that act ethically, on the other hand, improve their international standing through enhanced status and prestige. This is especially the case for middle powers that lack the resources to apply hard power to shape international developments. Based on this logic, state sovereignty may take a backseat to ethics based on these potential alternative gains. For instance, middle powers may be inclined to provide United Nations peacekeepers as a means to enhance their international standing even if their troops are not under the command of their own officers and the peacekeeping mission does not have any implications for the peacekeeper-donor state's national security. For these reasons, many have argued that we should expect middle powers to promote ethical behavior (Thakur 1991; Cooper et al. 1993; Nossal 1993; Higgott 1997; Cooper 2001). As a middle power, Canada would fit within such expectations. Therefore, the first liberal hypothesis (LH) involves ethics:

Liberal Hypothesis (LH) 1: Canada will be involved in international efforts to promote ethical behavior, even at the expense of sovereignty.⁵

The belief in the significance of international cooperation reveals an assumption that international politics, based on mutual interests, can be a positive-sum game, i.e. multiple actors can gain simultaneously. Whereas realism sees international relations more as a zero-sum game, where states try to gain relative to other states to enhance their survivability, liberalism emphasizes win-win situations where absolute gains can be attained for many (for discussion, see Powell 1991). Accordingly, liberalism sees International Governmental Organizations (IGO) as having a significant role and/or promise in international politics (Keohane and Martin 1995). Middle powers can use IGOs to promote their standing in moving international politics in a cooperative and ethical direction (Fox 1977; Jensen 1987; Papadakis and Starr 1987; Wood 1988; Pratt 1990; Thakur 1991; Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal 1993; Keating 1993; Nossal 1993, 2010; Stairs 1998).⁶ After all, middle powers “power” rests more in the techniques of soft rather than hard power (Flemes 2007).

From this perspective, middle powers should be expected to pursue foreign policies that benefit the international environment as a whole (i.e. absolute gains) rather than focus on narrow, national self-interests (Cooper 2001, 321). Again, the conclusion is rational and not necessarily based on Carr’s “idealism.” As a middle power, one would expect Canada to place great weight on participation in IGOs, in particular the United Nations, and to maintain significant ethical components within its foreign policy. Bilateralism can also play a role as long as ethics play a central role in the policy. Hence the logic for the following liberal hypotheses:

LH 2: Canada will pursue foreign policies that promote absolute gains rather than narrow, self-interested gains.

LH 3: Canada will pursue ethically-oriented bilateral or internationalist (multilateral), non-military alliance, IGO approaches to international problems rather than unilateralist, self-help oriented bilateral or military alliance-based techniques.

In the realm of economics, neo-liberalism posits that the international system is not as anarchical as realists suggest due to the intricate web of interconnectivity among states in terms of economic and social exchange known as “complex interdependence” (Keohane and Nye 2001; Rourke and Boyer 2010, 22). Like realism, rationalism is central to the liberal argument in that states are fundamentally self-interested; but unlike realists, liberals believe egoism can logically lead to absolute gains. The gains to be had by avoiding conflict, and therefore spending less on the military, and through continuing and expanding trade lead to the promotion of international law/ethics.⁷ As agents for such efforts, IGOs status will be enhanced and anarchy will diminish. IGOs that promote the liberal economics of free trade will be of particular importance as vehicles for international economic regimes that promote cooperative strategies to economic growth.

The status of middle powers suggests that they have had received at least some benefits from the international economic structures established at Bretton Woods in 1944. This suggests that middle powers would be likely to support the liberal international economic order. Add to this artifact the expectations that middle powers will pursue absolute gains as noted above, one would expect Canada to support multilateral approaches to international economics, in particular those associated with a positive-sum view of trade, rather than mercantilistic perspectives. Finally, as middle powers are expected to pursue altruistic foreign policies to promote a less anarchic and more ethical/just world, foreign aid assistance should be geared to aiding needy states rather than opening markets for the benefit of Canadian businesses. The liberal economic hypotheses for this research are as follows:

LH 4: Canada will strongly support the liberal international economic order and the IGOs that promote a positive-sum view of international economics.

LH 5: Canadian foreign aid assistance will be primarily geared towards aiding needy states rather than as a means to open up markets and/or aid Canadian businesses.

LH 6: Canada will not promote/champion Canadian businesses.

The hypotheses focus on three primary exigencies of liberalism where the perspective diverges from realism: 1) There is a greater emphasis on cooperation in an anarchic system; 2) the likelihood of cooperation increases as states increase the number of their interactions; and 3) rationally based ethics will develop from repeated interactions and reinforce the cooperative tendencies of states. These premises are incorporated in the six hypotheses and allow for comparisons with the six matching realist hypotheses.

The hypotheses for both theories are listed in Table 1. The complexities and nuances of realism and liberal internationalism naturally contribute to divisions within each school of thought. Accordingly, ontological debates can occur within each theory regarding rationalist and normative motivations. Profound theoretical debates can naturally contribute to variance of interpretation. Hence, divergence of opinion is expected regarding fundamental expectations of grand theories. The hypotheses presented here, therefore, cannot bridge such discord. These expectations, however, are grounded in the fundamental suppositions of each theory.

Methods

The cases for this exploratory investigation are drawn from “Canada’s World: Historic Timeline” (2009), a listing of major initiatives and events since 1931 compiled by the Canadian government. The sample drawn from the Timeline consists of 12 cases of Canadian foreign policy behavior in the 1970s. The potential for selection bias obviously exists due to the fact that

instances of Canadian foreign policy behavior are exponentially more numerous than those contained in the list. Why is the timeline used as the sample source? To begin, the Timeline is an external source, hence preventing purposeful or inadvertent researcher selection bias based on personal theoretical beliefs. After all, author predispositions are one of the likeliest contributors to selection bias. Secondly, the Timeline includes all of the most significant foreign policy decisions from the 1970s. The data comes from a public source that can be independently evaluated by the reader. A review of the cases makes abundantly clear that there are no noteworthy omissions. Moreover, none of the decisions are trivial or inconsequential, which enhances the plausibility of this test of Canadian foreign policy. In short, the “Canada’s World: Historic Timeline” is a solid and robust rendering of the substantial foreign policy issues with which Canada was confronted during the decade. A third reason is the Timeline contains an array of behaviors, which allows for an examination of a broad range of actions. This provides for a more thorough test of the contending theories. A fourth factor behind the use of the Timeline is practical in nature: Space considerations limit the feasibility of investigating all Canadian foreign policy actions in the 1970s. With all this in mind, the present investigation provides a baseline for assessing Canadian foreign policy in the 1970s and is therefore a starting rather than ending point. It is hoped that such an examination helps encourage further debate regarding the reality of Canadian foreign policy behavior during this vital decade.

The size of the sample is beneficial in two primary ways. First, the review of the individual cases helps lessen the limited specificity of statistical aggregation (see Mello 2014, 47). It allows for assessment on a case-by-case basis, which can capture details that can be lost in broad analyses of large samples. Secondly, by having a sample size larger than typical qualitative analyses, one can aggregate results with an eye towards generalizability. The statistic used here

is the simplest and most direct: percentages.⁸ Brief descriptions of individual cases are provided followed by a discussion outlining the logic regarding the fit of the hypotheses. The brevity of the case studies, which may be seen as problematic to some, fit a methodologic logic here and serves a purpose. To begin, the cases are all well-known and do not require extensive elaboration. Secondly, the presentations are barebones to avoid extensive inclusion of the perspectives of those who have analyzed the events, hence lessening the likelihood of interpretive bias leeching into the case studies. Finally, as this research is simply assessing the applicability of the hypotheses, there is no need to flesh out causal links between independent and dependent variables. Applicability is assessed based on whether the behavior exhibited in the case matches/fits the expectations of the hypotheses. Explanation is provided for the decision regarding the fit for each hypothesis for every case.

As mentioned above, the hypotheses for each theory numerically correspond with their counterparts for comparative purposes. This allows for comparisons where the theories diverge. The tallies for hypothesis applicability and percentages of cases when the hypotheses fit the observed behavior provide a numerical window into the validity of the theories in a straightforward, clear and direct manner. The results for the accuracy of the hypotheses are compiled below in Table 2. As the hypotheses are multilateral (i.e. at the international or systems level) in nature, cases that are bilateral without multilateral implication are not included in the data. The semi-sovereign nature of the province makes Quebec's growing relations with France a difficult case. Although certainly open to dispute, Quebec is treated as a sovereign nation when its behaviors are international in nature. However, as this research is investigating Canadian foreign policy, the Canadian national government has to be involved in the international behavior for the

event to be included in the data. Moreover, relations that involve only Ottawa and Quebec City are seen in this research as internal rather than international in nature.

The application of the hypotheses is determined by the case at hand. In some instances, the hypotheses are not applicable and are categorized as such. This is particularly the case for the economically-based hypotheses in instances of military-oriented events. The inclusion of economically-based hypotheses, however, remains vital as an alternative window into a wider range of state behaviors. Emphasis of military-oriented events is useful in this theoretical investigation for such instances are clearly in the realm of “high politics” (see Waltz 1979). Expanded descriptive analysis is provided for Canada’s claim that the Artic Archipelago as internal waters and the decision to recognize China, the most dramatic and significant instances of high politics in the 1970s. The decisions to provide and then stop nuclear aid to India and Pakistan are also classified as instances of high politics and are included in the sample of such cases. The counts for the applications of the hypotheses to instances of high politics are listed in Table 3. The entire process allows for a comparative theoretical analysis of liberalism and realism as applied to Canadian foreign policy in the 1970s.

Canadian Foreign Policy in the 1970s

The “Canada’s World: Historic Timeline” (2009) begins the decade by combining two interrelated events that occurred in 1970. The first is the adoption of a 0.7 per cent of GNP target for foreign aid. The second event is the establishment of the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), a public corporation designed to fund research on the needs of developing countries. The IDRC supports researchers and innovators in developing countries. Although the lion share of funding for the Centre comes from the Canadian government, they do work with and receive funding from other international organizations. The IDRC also seeks to aid countries

while promoting Canadian values of “political and intellectual pluralism and intellectual diversity, evidence-based policy-making, and democratic dialogue” (IDRC 2014). The organization seeks to promote development, but also equitable growth. *Application of hypotheses to case*: Spending more on foreign aid to developing countries can lessen sovereignty by limiting resources; hence LH 1 is supported while RH 1 is not. The activities of the IDRC are internationalist and long-term in nature (i.e. not based on easy profits) and therefore support LH 2 and 3 and not RH 2 and 3. Increased aid to needy countries and the creation of the IDRC fit the expectations of the liberal economic hypotheses, but not those from the realist perspective.⁹

Canada helped in the establishment of the Agence de Coopération Culturelle et Technique (ACCT) as a founding member. The ACCT was the forerunner of La Francophonie, which represents states where the French language is either the mother tongue or used by a significant minority. The primary missions of the organization are the protection of French culture and language and the promotion of cooperation among member states. Over time, La Francophonie has increased membership and support in Africa. *Application of hypotheses to case*: As the organization is international in orientation, involves ties to African states, and aids in protecting adherents to a particular culture, LH 1, 2, and 3 are supported while RH 1, 2, and 3 are not. The cultural orientation of La Francophonie limits the applicability of the economic hypotheses, but the evolving supports for African states can be interpreted as aid to needy states, which fits the expectations of LH 5.¹⁰

Canada claimed that the Arctic Archipelago is part of Canada’s “internal waters” as part of the Arctic Waters’ Pollution Prevention Act of April 1970. This official act extending Canadian sovereignty outlined a 100-mile pollution control zone around the Arctic islands. *Application of hypotheses to case*: Although not involving alignment, this unilateral effort to promote Canadian

sovereignty and seek territorial gains fits with the general expectations of RH 1, 2 and 3.

Although this move employs ethical behavior, i.e. limiting pollution, the fact the decision was unilateral and extends sovereignty leads to the conclusion that LH 1, 2 and 3 are not supported.

The potential issue of mineral rights in the region can be seen seeking macroeconomic gains and therefore fits the expectations of RH 4 and not those of LH 4. Because foreign aid and the direct promotion of Canadian businesses are not involved in the Act, RH 5 and 6 and LH 5 and 6 are counted as not applicable.¹¹

In October 1970, Canada became one of the first Western countries to officially recognize the People's Republic of China. *Application of hypotheses to case:* This unilateral action occurred prior to Kissinger's and Nixon's visits to China and therefore could have contributed to limited difficulties with the United States, and hence demonstrates foreign policy independence, an indicator of defending fundamental Canadian sovereignty. Moreover, the potential of opening up China's market had profound trade/gains ramifications for Canada. Accordingly, RH 1, 2 and 3 are supported and LH 1, 2 and 3 are not. The action also fits the economic expectations of RH 4 and 6 while running counter to LH 6. The breaking down of barriers and the potential for positive sum gains for both countries lead to the conclusion that LH 4 is also supported. As foreign aid is not immediately associated with recognition, RH 5 and LH 5 are counted as not applicable.¹²

Canada cosponsored the United Nations Conference on the Human environment in June 1972, the first international meeting designed to address global environmental issues.

Application of hypotheses to case: The internationalist action potentially lessened Canadian decision-making in this area and pursuit of national economic gains and hence do not fit the expectations of RH 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6. On the other hand, the behavior fits the anticipations of LH

1, 2, 3, 4, and 6. The Declaration of the Conference from June 16, 1972 includes the suggestion that developed countries should aid developing countries to lessen inequality and promote environmentally-friendly economic growth (United Nations Environmental Programme 2014). This confirms LH 5 while running counter RH 5.¹³

In 1972 Canada became a permanent observer to the Organization of American States (OAS)¹⁴ and full member of the Inter-American Development Bank. Article 3 of the OAS Charter includes principles regarding social justice, pacific relations, and equality of treatment of all member states (Organization of American States 2014). The goals of the Inter-American Developmental Bank include reducing poverty and inequality and promoting sustainable growth (Inter-American Development Bank 2014). *Application of hypotheses to case:* These internationalist developments speak to ethically-based, multilateral pursuit of absolute gains which confirm the expectations of the liberal hypotheses while running counter to the expectations of the realist hypotheses.

In alignment with the Colombo Plan of 1956, Canada supplied India with a Canadian-built nuclear reactor in May 1974. Although it can be argued that this move was related to the promotion of economic development in India and the peaceful use of nuclear power in accordance with the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission,¹⁵ the fact that Canada saw the Colombo plan as a means to opening Asian markets and was competing with other states to make the sale, the first of its kind for Canada, points to a desire for national gains (Bratt 2006, 90). Hence there is potential support for both realist and liberal arguments. Moreover, the Colombo Plan sought bilateral, not multilateral, agreements. Because the nature of the Colombo Plan is contested, one perspective claiming self-help motivations and the other absolute gains, there is potential support for both realist and liberal interpretations of bilateralism. Finally, Canada was

aligned with the United States in the endeavor with Canada supplying the reactor and the U.S. supplying the heavy water. *Application of hypotheses to case:* The net result of this case is a theoretical conundrum with legitimate arguments for both theoretical perspectives. This research deals with these contradictions by straddling the theoretical fence and finding moderate support for all the realist hypotheses and LH 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. Liberal hypothesis 6 is not supported as Canadian businesses did benefit from the decision.

The allocation of 0.53 per cent of GNP to development assistance in the 1975-76 budgetary year was the highest percentage Canada has ever contributed. The percentage did not meet the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) target of 0.7 per cent, a level of aid few countries have attained. *Application of hypotheses to case:* This aggregated measure of aid does not allow for testing of the first three hypotheses for each theory, therefore they are classified as not applicable. On the other hand, this development does fit the focus of the economic hypotheses for both theories. This type of aid confirms the three liberal economic hypotheses, but does not fit the expectations of the realist economic hypotheses.

Between 1975 and 1980, Canada accepted 69,000 refugees from Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. *Application of hypotheses to case:* Again, the nature of these activities do not allow for a test of the first three hypotheses of the theories, hence they are categorized as not applicable. Accepting refugees can be interpreted as a form of international aid. Moreover, the nature of political developments in Indochina during this period work against the notion that such assistance was a method of opening up markets in the region. Accordingly, the three economic realist hypotheses are not supported. Moreover, the acceptance of refugees is not related to positive-sum view of economics, therefore LH 4 is not applicable. These developments do allow for the application of LH 5 and 6, both of which are supported.

In light of the India's and Pakistan's nuclear bomb programs, with India detonating a nuclear bomb in 1974 and Pakistan refusing to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1976, Canada formally ended its nuclear relations with both countries in May 1976. *Application of hypotheses to case:* This event can be seen as a means of promoting ethical behavior and hence provides support for LH 1. Canada's reaction dovetailed that of the United States which supports RH 1. The decision can be seen as strengthening Canadian-U.S. relations, especially in light of the tensions brought on by Canada's acceptance of draft dodgers from the U.S., and therefore fits RH 2. LH 2 is also supported based on the absolute gains of working for non-proliferation. The symmetry of the action with the U.S. also provides modest support for RH 3. LH 3 is also supported based on the ethical considerations behind the decision. The fact that this move ended aid makes RH 4 and 5 and LH 4 and 5 not applicable. On the other hand, the Canadian nuclear industry lost profit-making opportunities in two countries, which runs counter to RH 6 but supports LH 6.¹⁶

Canada signed the Framework for Economic Cooperation with Japan in October 1976 in order to diversify Canadian trade.¹⁷ *Application of hypotheses to case:* The fact that Canada was attempting to make its economy less reliant on trade with the U.S. speaks to a desire to survive and protect and enhance state sovereignty and hence fits with the expectations of RH 1. The signing of the framework also provided the possibility of potential gains which supports RH 2 and 3. The decision, on the other hand, does not support LH 1, 2, and 3. The agreement sought to improve Canadian economic interests but from a positive-sum perspective and therefore does not support RH 4 but does confirm LH 4. Both RH 5 and LH 5 are not applicable as the development does not involve foreign aid. Canada was seeking to promote Canadian business interests indicating support for RH 6, but not for LH 6.

Canada joined the G7 in June 1976. The decision meant that Canada might have to follow G7 decisions and therefore lessen state sovereignty. Moreover, the gains sought would be absolute rather than relative, easy gains and are multilateral in nature. Finally, the G7 is a non-military IGO. *Application of hypotheses to case:* With all this in mind, joining the G7 is in line with outlooks of LH 1, 2, and 3, but does not support RH 1, 2, 3. The G 7 is one of the most significant organizations promoting the liberal international economic order and does not seek to aid individual businesses in member states. Accordingly, LH 4 and 6 are supported and RH 4 and 6 are not. Foreign aid is not central to this occurrence and therefore Both RH 5 and LH 5 are not applicable.

Cases of High Politics

Arctic Archipelago Claimed as Internal Waters

James and James (2014, 198) assert that, regarding Canadian behavior, “(r)ealism is able to account for a wide range of events in the Arctic.” This claim fits the passage of the Arctic Waters’ Pollution Prevention Act in 1970. Asserting the waters of the Arctic Archipelago as internal waters speaks to relative gains regarding potential competitors. The Act states, “no person or ship shall deposit or permit the deposit of waste of any type in the Arctic waters” (Government of Canada 2012). This contention extends sovereignty over persons and ships, a move invariably directed at the actions of other state’s shipping, including the United States.

The focus on pollution, a topic of interest by that time, suggests a promotion of a new environmental regime. However, the move was unilateral and occurred in light of potential alternative international claims from states such as Denmark, the Soviet Union, and the United States. In other words, the trendy topic of pollution provided the opportunity to demonstrate Canadian independence of action. This was particularly relevant considering the irritant of U.S.

Naval transit in the region. Hence, despite Can/Am defense arrangements brought on by the Cold War, Canada still sought autonomy in this region of geo-strategic significance. The conclusion is that although aspects of liberalism are represented, this action has profoundly realist inclinations.

Recognition of China

Canada was the first Western country to recognize Mainland China in October 1970. Although many in Canada were subsumed by the October Crisis and may have failed to give the policy considerable attention at the time, there is little doubt this shift was profound. The decision occurred despite the substantial support the U.S. had provided Taiwan since the late 1940s. Recognition certainly aided The People's Republic of China's international profile at a time when it was experiencing the chaotic Cultural Revolution and helped set the stage for inclusion in the UN. The significant Chinese population in Canada would indicate that domestic politics considerations may have played a role in the decision, even in light of the fact that some in the Chinese community in Canada opposed to move due to fears of Maoist interpretations of communism (McCabe 2010).

Recognition was quickly followed by a visit by Jean-Luc Pepin, Canadian Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce, suggesting a strong interest in promoting Canadian self-interest in the form of expanded Canadian trade with China. Recognition of China also demonstrated foreign policy independence. The reaction of the U.S. has been described as "muted but unhappy" (Granatstein and Bothwell 1990, 186), underscoring the autonomous nature of the decision.¹⁸ The soon-to-follow U.S. recognition of China took some of the luster off of Trudeau's decision and directly affected Canadian sale of wheat to China, the fact remains that Canada was first and acted in an autonomous manner. The net conclusion regarding the

application of the test theories is that the behavior had overtones of liberalism with significant realist underpinnings.

Results

The tabulations for the fit of the hypotheses for all the cases are in table 1. The counts reveal greater support for liberal internationalism than realism with liberal hypotheses fitting 77% of the applied hypotheses in comparison to 39% for realism. Canadian foreign policy in the 1970s appears to fit traditional expectations of this middle power. These findings also support the theoretical anticipations for middle powers in terms of power transition theory. When examining cases of high politics as detailed in table 2, however, there is greater support for realism than liberalism. In fact, the performance of realism is exceptional. The 95% fit for applied hypotheses indicates powerful support for the explanatory power of realism. The findings for liberalism, on the other hand, are mixed with a 53% rate of fit for the applied hypotheses.

These findings suggest that both theories have utility in explaining Canadian foreign policy behavior in the 1970s. This outcome supports James and James (2014) conclusion that theoretical eclecticism is an appropriate approach for understanding Canadian foreign policy. Liberalism and realism are two of the theories they test when investigating Canadian behavior in the Arctic over time. The case of the Arctic Waters' Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA) reviewed here reveals how the two theories can intertwine. Clearly the assertions of sovereignty in the region match the precepts of realism. A realist may even argue that the focus on pollution was little more than rhetorical flourish disguising true intentions.¹⁹ Yet pollution cannot be discounted in an off-hand manner as an explanatory variable. Environmentalism had gained traction by 1970 in the minds of many. Moreover, the nationalism often associated with Prime

Minister Trudeau can include care for the environmental state of Canada, especially in light of domestic political concerns. A liberal would also be likely to remind us that liberalism does not ignore issues of power politics, but rather suggests there is more to international relations than such base-line issues.

The net conclusion is that liberalism, based on the numbers, does a superior job explaining Canadian foreign policy in the 1970s in general. In cases of high politics, however, realism out-performed liberalism.

Discussion

With the scion of Pierre Trudeau, Justin, ascending to power in October 2015, the influence of the past has a renewed relevance. Beyond the obvious familial link, the 1970s offer a glimpse into the collective identity and/or strategic culture of Canada that may have a very unique impact on the future. Even without such a distinctive connection, the decade, as part of the recent past, plays an important part in the development of Canadian foreign policy ethos and behavior, especially in light of the importance of Pierre Trudeau's influence on Canadian foreign policy. The debates regarding the nature of Canadian relations with the rest of the world in the post-9/11 era require assessments of the past to understand the present and potential paths for the future. This research is instructive regarding the reality of the 1970s and therefore contributes to understanding the scope of modern Canadian foreign policy.

The findings here raise issues regarding the distinction between high and low politics and fundamental methodological concerns. To begin, just what is the demarcation line between low and high politics? For instance, the sale of nuclear technology to India and Pakistan are classified here as issues of high politics considering their use in the development of nuclear weaponry. After all, the possession of nuclear weapons has profound implications regarding power politics

at the international level. Some may conclude that the sale of such technology should be seen as the innocent promotion of the peaceful use of nuclear energy as envisioned by the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. Even though this research comes to one conclusion, one could logically come to a different conclusion in part due to definitional uncertainty between high and low politics.

The problematic distinction between low and high politics fails to address the argument that liberals see low politics as a means of addressing high politics in the long run. For example, the supposed low politics variables of expansion of foreign aid or the promotion of the values associated with the OAS can conceivably contribute to greater domestic stability in many states and hence contribute to a more stable and peaceful world in the long run. Such outcomes certainly would fit within the realm of high politics. From this perspective, one could argue that liberalism actually performs better than is suggested here.

The methodological implications of this paper highlight some of the potential benefits associated with research with sample sizes that fit between small n, qualitative and large n, quantitative studies. If one were to reply upon the numbers, one would easily conclude that liberal internationalism trumps realism in the case of Canada. As the analysis of the results indicates, however, such a conclusion would be somewhat misleading as reflection on cases involving high politics provided insights supportive of realism. This artifact speaks to potential drawbacks of relying exclusively on either qualitative or quantitative methods.²⁰

Perhaps the most significant suggestion that can be drawn here regards theoretical eclecticism. James and James (2014) argue that Canadian foreign policy requires the application of multiple theories and levels of analysis to understand behavior. This research does not examine domestic level variables and only touches upon individual level influence, yet even

within a systems level focus the findings indicate utility of more than one theory. In terms of the debate regarding realism, liberalism and Canadian foreign policy, this confirms the expectations of those who argue that both approaches impact Canadian foreign policy. Hence there is support here for those that suggest that theoretical eclecticism is appropriate for the study of Canadian foreign policy.

Conclusion

Canadian foreign policy behavior is often characterized as profoundly liberal in orientation. This research investigates this claim and finds support for it. The book is not closed on the subject, however, as evidential support is found for realism in some of the most significant actions of the 1970s. The evidence, on the whole, indicates that Canadian foreign policy exhibited theoretical shades of gray that trended towards liberalism. The conclusion is based on a descriptive and numerical investigation of a meso-level sample of foreign policy behaviors, an approach that contributes to a more nuanced and hopefully representative assessment of reality. This research does not claim to offer the definitive answer as to the precise nature of Canadian action, but rather suggests that there is room for discussion regarding Canada's place in the world during the 1970s.

In Canadian foreign policy of the 1970s, we do not find the pure "idealism" cited by Carr (1946), but rather a liberal internationalist logic that is aware of realist propositions. The findings here suggest that liberalism is a good starting point for understanding Canadian behavior, but it is not the ending point.

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Table 1. Listing of realist and liberal hypotheses

Realist Hypothesis (RH) 1: Canada, in general, will take steps to guarantee state survival and hence protect a fundamental level of state sovereignty. Accordingly, Canada will align itself with allies powerful enough to deter attacks from threatening or potential enemy states.

RH 2: Canada will align itself with powerful states or pursue bilateral policies in order to achieve profits or easy gains.

RH 3: Canada will pursue unilateral, self-help oriented bilateral or military alliance-based strategies rather than ethically-oriented bilateral or internationalist (multilateral), non-military alliance, IGO approaches.

RH 4: Canada will pursue economic policies that promote Canadian macroeconomic and/or business interests, even at the expense of other state's economic fortunes.

RH 5: Canada will offer foreign aid assistance to less developed countries primarily as a means to increase access to foreign markets.

RH 6: Canada will promote/champion Canadian companies.

Liberal Hypothesis (LH) 1: Canada will be involved in international efforts to promote ethical behavior, even at the expense of sovereignty.

LH 2: Canada will pursue foreign policies that promote absolute gains rather than narrow, self-interested gains.

LH 3: Canada will pursue ethically-oriented bilateral or internationalist (multilateral), non-military alliance, IGO approaches to international problems rather than unilateralist, self-help oriented bilateral or military alliance-based techniques.

LH 4: Canada will strongly support the liberal international economic order and the IGOs that promote a positive-sum view of economics.

LH 5: Canadian foreign aid assistance will be primarily geared towards aiding needy states rather than as a means to open up markets and/or aid Canadian businesses.

LH 6: Canada will not promote/champion Canadian businesses.

Table 2. Results of the application of realist and liberal hypotheses for 1970s

Realist Hypotheses	Total Number of Times Hypothesis Fit the Case	Total Number of Times Hypothesis are Not Supported	Percentage for Good Fit of Hypothesis when Applied	Total Number of Times Hypothesis are Not Applicable	Total Number of Hypotheses Applications
RH 1	5	5	50%	2	10
RH 2	5	5	50%	2	10
RH 3	5	5	50%	2	10
RH 4	3	7	30%	2	10
RH 5	1	5	17%	6	6
RH6	3	7	30%	2	10
Totals	22	34	39%	16	56
Liberal Hypotheses					
LH 1	7	3	70%	2	10
LH 2	7	3	70%	2	10
LH 3	7	3	70%	2	10
LH 4	8	1	89%	3	9
LH 5	7	0	100%	5	7
LH 6	7	3	70%	2	10
Totals	43	13	77%	16	56

Table 3. Results of the application of realist and liberal hypotheses for 1970s for cases of “high politics”

Realist Hypotheses	Total Number of Times Hypothesis Fit the Case	Total Number of Times Hypothesis are Not Supported	Percentage for Good Fit of Hypothesis when Applied	Total Number of Times Hypothesis are Not Applicable	Total Number of Hypotheses Applications
RH 1	4	0	100%	0	4
RH 2	4	0	100%	0	4
RH 3	4	0	100%	0	4
RH 4	3	0	100%	1	3
RH 5	1	0	100%	3	1
RH6	2	1	67%	1	3
Totals	18	1	95%	5	19
Liberal Hypotheses					
LH 1	2	2	50%	0	4
LH 2	2	2	50%	0	4
LH 3	2	2	50%	0	4
LH 4	2	1	67%	1	3
LH 5	1	0	100%	3	1
LH 6	1	2	33%	1	3
Totals	10	9	53%	5	19

¹This paper is part of a larger project examining Canadian foreign policy from 1950-2010. An article covering the 1960s using the same methodological template was published in the *New England Journal of Political Science* 8, 1: 50-85 (2015).

² *The Nobel Foundation* 1999, 140.

³ Walt (1985) argues that Canada bandwagons with the United States due to Canada’s isolation and limited military means in conjunction with the United States’ benign policy towards Canada.

⁴ Plesch and Weiss (2016) make the case that the Allies alliances during World War, between 1942-1945, are a form of realist “multilateralism” as the efforts included operational political and humanitarian aspects such as the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. This perspective is captured by a statement by Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1943, “We mean business in this war in a political and humanitarian sense just as surely as we mean business in a military sense (Plesch and Weiss 2016, 5)”.

⁵ One would expect states to make the claim that their foreign policies are ethical. The fact that this research can view actions in hindsight enables assessment as to the degree to which behavior involved ethical components.

⁶ International ethics involve obligations of economically developed countries to aid less developed states (for discussion, see Baylis, Smith and Owens 2008, chapter 11).

⁷ Some recent research has gone so far as to argue that capitalism promotes international peace (see Gartzke 2007), although not all agree with this conclusion (Seung-Whan 2011).

⁸ The approach here has similarities to Qualitative Comparative Analysis which is an approach to systematize studies of meso-size samples (see Mello 2014).

⁹ One could argue that the IDRC is a tool of the capitalist class in Canada, but the focus on equity and local development leads this research to conclude otherwise.

¹⁰ LH 4 and 6 and RH 4, 5 and 6 are counted as not applicable for this case.

¹¹ The “Canada’s World: Historic Timeline” (2009) includes Pierre Trudeau’s “Foreign Policy for Canadians” policy statement of June 1970. As the pronouncement is not a direct foreign policy behavior, it is not counted in the data.

¹² Included in the timeline is the introduction of pro-multicultural policy in October 1971. Although the policy could have indirect international implications, it was domestic in nature and therefore is excluded from the data.

¹³ “Canada’s World: Historic Timeline” (2009) includes the “Summit Series” of hockey between Canada and the Soviet Union in September 1972. Although the series had ramifications regarding the on-going international contestation of capitalism and communism, the event was bilateral and did not involve systemic power or economic issues and is hence excluded from the data.

¹⁴ Canada did not officially join the OAS until 1990.

¹⁵ The irony if this was the case is that India used plutonium fuel from the plant to build its first nuclear device.

¹⁶ “Canada’s World: Historic Timeline” (2009) includes the 1976 Montreal Olympics. The scope of participation, the fact that the games has been long established, and the desire of states to host the Olympics make difficult the application of International Relations theory to the event as a means to test an individual state’s foreign policy. Accordingly, this event is not included in this analysis.

¹⁷ The lion’s share of Canadian trade is with the United States.

¹⁸ For discussion of the trade agreements and modest gains for Canada, see Granatstein and Bothwell 1990, 187-88.

¹⁹ For instance, the CIA came to such a conclusion seeing AWPPA as a means for expanding oil and mineral rights (Bronskill 2014).

^{XVI} Political science seeks to assess reality as a means to describe, explain and predict political behavior. Both logic (i.e. theory) and observation (i.e. evidence) guide us to our conclusions. The two broad methods we have at our disposal to assess reality are qualitative and quantitative techniques. Both have their strengths and weaknesses. With qualitative methods, accuracy for the case at hand is high but generalizability is low. Quantitative methods can suggest generalizable trends and patterns, but may not be accurate to the case at hand. Combining both techniques for a meso-level sample size provides the opportunity to glean the best from both, although we must still contend with the methodological dilemmas of each. Moreover, the results can be messy, less parsimonious, and less robust. Such is the case here. Despite this, the goal of assessing reality requires the inclusion of all empirical techniques to increase both accuracy and generalizability of what is the often-messy and convoluted arena of human political behavior.