

Democratic Foreign Policy and the Cold War: Variations in Behavior During Periods of International Constraint.

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Abstract

A growing body of literature, drawing on comparative perspectives, argues that democracies vary to such an extent that they should not be treated as homogeneously as they are by democratic peace theory. The article, therefore, returns to the monadic hypothesis to disaggregate the democratic peace. The Cold War period is examined based on the expectations that the foreign policy behaviors of democracies should have been constrained by systemic bipolarity in addition to domestic democratic governance. Using Lijphart's dichotomous typology of democracies, the evidence indicates that institutional variation can affect the foreign policy of democracies even during times of systemic constraint as majoritarianism is found to be linked with more conflict-prone foreign policies than consensualism. It is argued that consensual democracies have institutional and procedural structures that restrain adventuresome executives while the majoritarian pattern of executive power concentrations provides a greater opportunity for leaders who view the international environment in conflictual terms to pursue aggressive foreign policies. The evidence supports these expectations.

Key Words: Democracy, Institutions, Foreign Policy, Cold War

Much has been written about the foreign policy tendencies of democracies. A great deal of evidence has been found suggesting that democracies rarely engage in direct, militarized disputes with other democracies (Singer and Small 1976; Doyle 1983; Maoz and Russett 1993; Russett 1993). More recently, researchers have begun to look at the nuances of what causes variation in conflict and cooperation in the foreign policies of democracies (see Risse-Kappen 1991; Owen 1994; Hermann and Kegley 1995; Kaarbo 1996; Braumoeller 1997; Auerswald 1999; Gaubatz 1999; Palmer, London, and Regan 2004, Kaarbo and Beasley 2008; Clare 2010). This process of specification has led to the inclusion of variables such as threat perception, leadership style, political parties, institutional structures, political oppositions, ideology, electoral cycles, decision-making processes and the depth of liberal philosophy into the theoretical discourse. Although dyadic relations among democracies are not ignored by conflict and cooperation literature, the approach focuses more generally on why democracies pursue conflictual or cooperative foreign policies. In other words, monadic *and* dyadic relations are subject to examination. This research continues along this path.

Although supporters of democratic peace theory acknowledge that democracies can be aggressive towards non-democracies, they argue that the evidence indicates that democracies do not fight one another due to domestic level variables inherent in democracies. Others are less certain (See Farber and Gowa 1995; Risse Kappen 1995; Hermann and Kegley 1995; Mansfield and Snyder 1994). Some have argued that conflict among democracies is masked by narrow definitions of democracy such as in the War of 1812, the Spanish-American War, or Imperial Germany and World War I (Oren 1995; Peceny 1997).

To address the definitional criticism, Owen (1994) suggests that it is not democracy that prevents wars between democracies, but rather liberalism within democracies. In other words, it

is cultural liberalism and the associated values that prevent aggressive foreign policies, not just simply democratic procedures. From this point of view, illiberal democracies (i.e. democracies that limit participation and civil rights and lack institutions that promote equality) may be more prone to militarized interstate disputes. From a theoretical perspective, what Owen is suggesting is that rather than focusing on interactions between democracies, we need to look inside the “black box.”

I agree with Owen and assume that we need to look inside the black box to assess the foreign policy of democracies. Rather than focus solely on the more abstract notion of cultural values, however, I argue that differences in procedural democracy may in fact account for divergent foreign policy outputs. Procedural democracy refers to the institutional structures and procedural norms of democracies. As comparative politics makes clear, these factors vary in style and form across democracies. If such pre-existing differences correlate with deviations in foreign policy as expected within a supporting theoretical framework, then it can be argued that procedural democracy does influence foreign policy outputs. The objective here, therefore, is to investigate whether variation in democratic institutional structures and procedures are associated with and therefore contribute to variation in foreign policy outputs. In fact, there are theoretically intriguing reasons to believe procedural democracy influences policy rather than simply being representative of liberal cultural values.

Lijphart, in *Patterns of Democracy* (1999), suggests that there are two ideal types of institutional democracies: consensus and majoritarian. He finds evidence that indicates that while both consensus and majoritarian democracies possess relatively equal potential for effective decision-making, consensus democracies are inherently more democratic (i.e. liberal in a current rather than classical sense). Lijphart finds that consensus democracies are more likely

to have extensive welfare states, protect the environment more effectively, put fewer people in prison, be more generous in giving aid to developing countries, have less corruption, have less disparity between the classes, provide a fuller complement of women's rights, and be more generally focused on equality.¹ Consensual democracies, he argues, are characterized by inclusiveness, bargaining, and compromise. The majoritarian model of democracy, on the other hand, is exclusive, competitive, and adversarial (Lijphart 1999, 2). These traits suggest that majoritarian democracies may be more likely to be illiberal (i.e. try to stifle rather than accommodate opposition) and therefore, according to Owen, more prone to pursue aggressive foreign policies. In other words, graft Lijphart's findings and Owen's intuitions together and one is left with the expectation that majoritarianism could be more likely to be associated with international conflict than consensualism.

Moreover, majoritarian structures, as discussed below, concentrate power in the executive to a greater degree than consensus systems. They, therefore, provide fewer impediments for leadership to overcome, including leaders whose worldviews are more conflictual than cooperative in nature. Therefore, leaders that are more prone towards aggressive, militaristic foreign policies have more opportunities to pursue their preferences in majoritarian systems.² The ramifications of structural differences are augmented by the consideration that foreign policy naturally tends to fall within the realm of the executive, especially in crisis situations, further enhancing the significance of leaders in the decision-making process. With all this in mind, the primary question of this research is the following: Are majoritarian democracies more prone to interstate conflict than consensus democracies?

¹ Iverson and Soskice (2006) also find that PR systems redistribute more than majoritarian systems. Lijphart and Bowman (1999), finds that consensualism is associated with greater generosity in foreign aid.

² This effect can be amplified if leadership view potential opponents, as Herman and Kegley (1995) suggest they do, as an "out-group" within social identity theory's in-group/out-group perceptual dichotomy.

Farber and Gowa (1995) argue that the statistical evidence of a dyadic democratic peace is an artifact of the systemic international divisions of the Cold War rather than state regime type. Democracies were in alliances against non-democracies and therefore avoided conflicts with other democracies. Therefore alliances, not democratic institutions, explain why democracies appear to rarely have militarized disagreements. Underlying this argument is the notion that the bipolar structure of the Cold War shaped and constrained the foreign policy behavior of democracies to the extent that their policies became alike. In other words, international pressures pushed democracies towards developing similar foreign policies. From this perspective, we would expect, *ceteris paribus*, democracies of all institutional and procedural stripes to have roughly analogous foreign policies during the Cold War.³ If divergence in the level of involvement in international disputes exists across democratic institutional and procedural types during the Cold War, then the evidence would indicate that variations in procedural democracy do have an impact on foreign policy outputs. This research, therefore, investigates if this is the case for the period of 1950-1992 and finds evidence that, even during periods of constraining international circumstances, variations in democratic institutional structures are associated with divergence in conflict-proneness.

Democratic peace theory has had, on the whole, an implicit tendency to neglect institutional variation within democracies. The research here seeks to address this shortcoming by applying a monadic approach to understanding the foreign policy of democracies. More specifically, this effort tests to see if the institutional structures of democracies as dichotomized by Lijphart affect foreign policy outcomes. The evidence indicates that consensus democracies are less prone to militarized interstate disputes than majoritarian democracies, which suggests

³ The obvious outlier would be the United States as it was the leading protagonist to the Soviet Union during the Cold War and was therefore likely to have a more active foreign policy, whether proactive or reactive, than other democracies.

that institutional structures do indeed affect the foreign policy behaviors of democracies. To make this case, several steps are taken.

The first section reviews democratic peace literature to examine its embedded claims. This review is followed by discussion of research that has sought to disaggregate democracies by viewing them heterogeneously and their foreign policy in a monadic fashion. This process fits this project into the larger theoretical picture regarding democratic peace, conflict and cooperation, and political institutions. The review, therefore, is also an effort to bridge the gap between international relations and comparative theory. The second segment of the paper outlines the theoretical framework, states the hypotheses under investigation and discusses the research methods that are employed. The third section analyzes the statistical results, which generally support the hypotheses. This research finds that consensualism correlates with less conflictual foreign policy outputs in comparison to majoritarianism indicating support for the notion that some institutions can constrain foreign policy decision-making more than others. In other words, the more liberal the institutions, the more peaceful a democracy's foreign policy will be.

Democracy and International Conflict

In the field of international relations, democratic peace theory has stirred debate and driven much research over the last few decades. There are two basic forms of the theory: the monadic and dyadic hypotheses. The monadic thesis is based on the notion that democracies are inherently more peaceful than countries with other governmental systems. The dyadic argument is democracies are less prone towards conflict with other democracies.

The thought that democracies are more pacific than other systems (i.e. the monadic hypothesis) has a long history in the United States. From Presidents Wilson to Bush II,

presidents have espoused liberal rhetoric suggesting that moves towards democracy will lead to a more peaceful world.⁴ This conventional wisdom was dealt a blow, however, when Singer and Small (1976) found strong evidence suggesting that democracies are just as war-prone as other regime types. Using the Correlates of War dataset (COW),⁵ Singer and Small found that the monadic hypothesis is not supported by systematic data. In other words, democracies are involved in as many wars as non-democracies. Although some dispute this finding (see Benoit 1996), others suggest that democracies are targets of aggression and, in addition, that democracies are more likely to come to the aid of their allies (see Leeds and Davis 1997; Gowa 1998), all of which would indicate that democracies are not as war-prone as the data suggests. In spite of these arguments, the evidence for the monadic hypothesis is, at best, mixed (for further discussion of the limitations of the monadic hypothesis, see Gates, Knutsen, and Moses 1996; Chan 1997). As detailed below, however, a body of research continues to examine the perspective as we continue to unpack the nature, style, and substance of democratic foreign policy.

Despite the lack of support for the monadic hypothesis, Singer and Small did find significant statistical evidence indicating that democracies do not become involved in wars with other democracies.⁶ Building on these findings and drawing on the theoretical inspiration of Immanuel Kant, Doyle (1983, 1986) develops a theoretical logic to explain the dyadic hypothesis. In “Perpetual Peace,” Kant argues that as democracy spreads from state to state, the chances for peaceful relations among states increases. He believed a “zone of peace” could be formed among democracies.

⁴ For a discussion of the codification of liberal assumptions in a systematic manner, see Moravcsik 1997.

⁵ The COW data consists of cases of direct military conflict. Disputes that are resolved short of war are not included in the dataset.

⁶ Dean Babst (1964) uncovered this pattern, but his work was published in the *Wisconsin Sociologist*, a relatively obscure publication. Hence, it was Singer and Small’s work that popularized the dyadic democratic peace.

Doyle suggests that two explanations exist for why democratic dyads are more peaceful. The first explanation, the normative or cultural argument, is that cultural norms within democracies are perceived by elites and the public as more pacific, by nature, than those of non-democracies. The beliefs in freedom from arbitrary justice, social and economic rights, and democratic participation and representation are believed to combine to form a normative philosophy that is simply less war prone. Moreover, the fact that the public has to pay the price for international conflicts and they influence governmental decision-making through democratic mechanisms contributes to the development of pacific cultural norms.⁷ States that share similar cultural norms (i.e. other democracies) are not seen as threatening and, therefore, differences between democracies, when they arise, can be ironed out before they escalate (see Friedman 2008).

The second explanation, the structural or institutional argument, is that institutional constraints restrict the ability of leadership to pursue aggressive foreign policies. These constraints include judicial equality, freedom of religion and the press, rule by representative legislatures, support for private property, and market-driven economies. These factors, it is argued, limit the potential for the development of conflictual foreign policy. Democratic institutions create forces that benefit from peace and these forces, in turn, have avenues for applying political pressure. Moreover, deliberative democratic institutions, in general, allow time for cooler heads to prevail.⁸

So why do democracies fight non-democracies? Doyle argues that the answer lies in the normative explanation. Both elites and the public, having been shaped by the cultural norms of

⁷ Mousseau (2000) argues that democratic values are actually the result of the “norms of contract” inherent in developed market economies.

⁸ In effect, this aspect of the argument suggests that less “efficient” and stream-lined decision-making contributes to the avoidance of international conflicts.

democratic societies, are more likely to view those states who do not respect such liberal values as aggressive, dangerous, even menacing, and therefore worthy of confronting. Because non-democracies are more likely to be seen as potential enemies, it is easier to develop support for war in a democracy when the opponent is not a democracy.

In the 1990s, robust theoretical and empirical support began to build in support of the dyadic democratic peace. Russett (1993a) finds evidence suggesting that the norm against war in democracies became ingrained in the late 19th century. Maoz and Russett, in addition to adding conceptual clarity by delineating assumptions for both the normative and structural models,⁹ expanded statistical backing for the dyadic hypothesis by using the Militarized Interstate Disputes dataset (MID) and controlling for economic development, alliances, and geographic contiguity. They found that “democracy, in and of itself, has a consistent and robust negative effect on the likelihood of conflict and escalation in a dyad”¹⁰ (1993, 624).

Russett (1993b) argues that it has been a mistake to concentrate on one or the other of Doyle’s explanations. He suggests that the best course of action is to combine both the normative and structural explanations. Maoz and Russett (1993) find the data supports both explanations, yet note that the evidence for the normative/cultural model is “more robust and consistent.” Moreover, Dixon (1994) finds that democratic states have a higher probability of

⁹ Normative Assumption 1: States, to the extent possible, externalize the norms of behavior that are developed within and characterize their domestic political processes and institutions. Normative Assumption 2: The anarchic nature of international politics implies that a clash between democratic and nondemocratic norms is dominated by the latter, rather than the former. Structural Assumption 1: International challenges require political leaders to mobilize domestic support for their policies. Such support must be mobilized from those groups that provide the leadership the kind of legitimacy that is required for international action. Structural Assumption 2: Shortcuts to political mobilization of relevant political support can be accomplished only in situations that can appropriately be described as emergencies (Maoz and Russett 1993, 625-26).

¹⁰ It should be mentioned that the MID dataset includes both wars and militarized conflicts short of war. Maoz and Russett’s findings using the MID dataset strengthen Singer and Small’s findings not only because they confirmed Small and Singer’s findings by using a different dataset, but also because the MID data has a larger universe of cases than the COW data. The increased number of cases is due to the inclusion disputes that did not lead to war. Disputes are categorized through the “Hostility Level” variable that consists of a scale of 1 to 5. The scale is coded in the following manner: 1 = No militarized actions, 2 = Threat to use force, 3 = Display of force, 4 = Use of force, 5 = War.

settlement in conflictual situations because they are culturally and institutionally “better equipped” to resolve disputes.

Critiques of the Democratic Peace

Not all are convinced the evidence found in support of the democratic peace has been compelling. One such critique by Farber and Gowa (1994) argues that peace between democracies has been primarily the result of the Cold War.¹¹ Spiro (1994) argues that the findings that democratic dyads do not go to war are statistically insignificant due to the low number (i.e. small n) of democratic dyads throughout history. Moreover, he suggests that definitional changes have made the dyadic hypothesis seem more convincing than it would otherwise be the case (see also Oren 1995; Peceny 1997).

Hagan (1994), on the other hand, argues that what goes inside the “black box” not only matters, but what occurs in democracies can profoundly influence whether they are conflict-prone or not. In particular, he suggests that we need to consider the nature of the political opposition as well as the political orientation of leadership, both of which vary widely across democracies, in order to assess the conflict-proneness of democracies. Morgan and Campbell (1991) focus on leadership constraints and opportunities to go to war and find that major powers with higher decisional constraints had a lower probability of being involved in conflicts that escalate to war, suggesting that domestic constraints are more relevant than democracy in and of itself.

Kegley and Hermann (1995) investigate the effect social identity (i.e. the us-group/them-group dichotomy) has on the perceptions of leaders and incorporates leadership sensitivity to their environments, suggesting that the causal relationship behind international conflict is far

¹¹ It is worth noting that Cederman and Rao (2001) develop a framework featuring time-varying parameters and find that the democratic peace is not due to Cold War effects.

more complex than adherents to democratic peace theory imply. Kacowicz (1997) examines two democratic/nondemocratic dyads (Peru and Columbia; Senegal vs. Mauritania) involved in conflicts that were settled short of war. He argues that “shared common cultural frameworks” help explain the avoidance of war in these cases, which suggests that the normative hypothesis can be applied to democratic and nondemocratic dyads.

Another domain of criticism of democratic peace theory can be found in the democratization literature. In addition to the arguments against the very existence of the democratic peace and those disputing the causal relationships involved discussed above, Mansfield and Snyder (1995) offer an alternative critique of democratic peace theory by suggesting that states in the process of democratization are particularly war-prone. They argue that, due to short time horizons, the difficulty of the transition, and the rise of polarizing politics and nationalistic sentiment, leadership in states making the transition to democracy (i.e. anocracies) are especially war-prone for international conflict can be a means of diverting attention away from problems at home. Matthews (1997) argues that democratization contributed to the escalation of conflict between Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

Owen (1994), siding with the cultural explanation, argues that only when liberal ideology is prevalent and citizens have leverage over decision-makers will democracies become less likely to pursue militarized foreign policies. Leadership in illiberal democracies (i.e. democracies that limit participation and civil rights and lack institutions that promote equality), on the other hand, is not restrained by cultural liberalism and the according institutional constraints and are therefore more likely to pursue conflictual foreign policies. In addition, Owen focuses on the perceptions of leadership in democracies. He argues that leaders in liberal democracies are more likely to perceive illiberal democracies as they would non-democracies and see them as

menacing. Similarly, Peceny (1997) argues that in the case of the Spanish-American War, the perception of illiberalism constructed by the press and members of Congress greatly contributed to war between democracies. Interestingly, Owen (1997) finds that Spanish elites also perceived the U.S. as increasingly illiberal as the conflict began to approach.¹²

Disaggregating Democracies in Explaining Peace

As the debates raged throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s about whether the democratic peace exists, the causal arguments behind democratic peace theory, and whether democratization is a good or bad development, another body of literature has developed that disaggregates the democratic peace by examining variance in levels of democratic peace. This research has turned back to the monadic hypothesis in hopes of honing the causal mechanisms behind the foreign policies of democratic states. As Elman (1997a, 39) notes, democratic peace theory has given “too much attention (to) democratic dyads.” Risse-Kappen (1995) argues that democratic peace theory may prove true, but views causation from the perspective of social identity theory based on “in-groups” and “out-groups” (see also Hermann and Kegley 1995; Peterson 1996). Moreover, he argues that historical experience can impact the likelihood of aversion to war, such as in the case of post-WWII Europe. The bottom line is that even some with optimistic appraisals of the potential for democratic peace are not entirely convinced of the causal arguments.

Elman (1997a, 1997b) argues that part of the problem with democratic peace theory is that the approach neglects important domestic level variables. He suggests that the theory ignores the role of leaders, underemphasizes norms that are not associated with domestic political ideology, obscures the role of political parties, and discounts how civil-military relations

¹² Owen also finds that Mexican liberals in the 1830s and 1840s began to see the U.S. as illiberal, suggesting similar dynamics in the build up to the Mexican-American War.

can concentrate or disperse war powers. Many have argued that these issues have risen because democratic peace theory neglects variations in democracy (see Kaarbo 1997; Auerswald, 1999; Gaubatz 1991; Lijphart 1999; Prins and Sprecher 1999; Auerswald 2000; Elman 2000; Palmer, London, and Regan 2004; Kaarbo and Beasley 2008; Clare 2010). In other words, democratic peace theory is under-specified. To deal with these shortcomings, this body of conflict and cooperation literature addresses leadership, domestic institutions, leadership and institutions interactions, and belief structures.

Leadership

Elman (1997a, 36) notes that democratic peace theory essentially means, “it matters little who rules.”¹³ Many do not agree that leadership does not matter. For instance, Kaarbo (1997) develops a framework for the study of prime minister leadership styles and finds that leadership style significantly affects the decision-making process, hence indirectly affecting foreign policy outcomes. Considering that a general agreement has developed that parliamentary democracies are becoming increasingly prime ministerial, this finding may have growing significance.¹⁴ Leadership has also been incorporated as a significant variable in a variety of domestic theoretical frameworks (see Morgan and Campbell 1991; Hagan 1994; Peterson 1996; Auerswald 1999; Gaubatz 1999; Auerswald 2000; Elman 2000; Palmer, London, and Regan 2004; Dyson 2006). For example, Gaubatz (1999) and Auerswald (1999) see leaders as important players within institutional structures.

Institutional Structures and Variable Interactions

A wide variety of theoretical frameworks have been developed that focus on the interactions between institutional structures and other intervening variables that may potentially

¹³ The irony, of course, is that this essentially liberal argument is defending the neo-realist proposition that it does not matter who leads.

¹⁴ For discussion, see Kaarbo 1997, 599.

affect foreign policy and suggest, despite Gowa's (1998) assertions, that politics does not stop at the water's edge. Kaarbo (1996) finds that in the cases of Germany and Israel, even junior coalition partners can have a significant impact on foreign policy. Peterson (1996) suggests that the strategic beliefs of leaders are constrained or empowered by institutional structures. These interactions, she argues, significantly influenced foreign policy outcomes. Morgan and Campbell (1991) argue that the degree of decisional constraint inherent in domestic structures significantly influences the decisions of leaders, hence, like Peterson, adding conditionality as to when leadership matters (see also Blondel and Müller-Rommel 1993; Ripsman 2002).¹⁵

Auerswald (1999) notes that a state's institutional structure profoundly affects whether an executive is domestically strong or weak. In other words, the more the legislature can influence foreign policy, the more constrained (i.e. weak) executives are in pursuing their policy preferences. He finds that the domestic strength of the executive significantly affects the potential for the use of force in international disputes. As Auerswald (1999, 470) notes, "domestically strong presidents are more likely to use force than weaker presidents or premiers in parliamentary governments, who in turn are more likely to use force than premiers in coalition parliamentary governments." Elman (2000) argues that the failure to acknowledge the differences between majoritarian and nonmajoritarian democracies limits the effectiveness of democratic peace theory. He finds that the interactions between the executive and the legislative are profoundly influenced by variation in the hawkish or dovish tendencies of both branches. These interactions, in turn, affect the conflict-proneness of the state in question. Lijphart and Bowman (1999) find that consensus democracies are more generous than majoritarian

¹⁵ On the other hand, Elman (2000) suggests that hawkish, junior coalition partners can "hijack" foreign policy, hence suggesting that moves from majoritarianism can contribute to foreign policy aggressiveness.

democracies in giving foreign aid; a measure which, they argue, is an indirect measure of democratic peace theory.

Gaubatz (1999) sees the structure and workings of domestic institutions as mediating the link between the domestic inputs of governmental leaders, opposition elites, and mass publics and foreign policy choices. It is through this contingent framework that he explains his findings regarding the effect electoral cycles have on foreign policy. The model attempts to capture the impact of belief structures on foreign policy. Braumoeller (1997), also examining belief structures, finds that a 19th century, European, nationalistic type of liberalism has taken root in the Soviet successor states, hence suggesting a less sanguine appraisal for the potential for democratic peace in the region. Palmer, London, and Regan (2004) examine the affect right/left politics and the vulnerability of leadership have on the propensity of a state to pursue international conflict and find that governments that lean right are more likely to use force (i.e. they are less likely to pay an electoral price for doing so), yet governments that lean left are more likely to see the disputes in which they are involved escalate. A growing body of research has confirmed that right-leaning governments, whether single party or coalitions, are likely to inject the military into foreign affairs (Klingemann, Hoffbart, and Budge 1994; Kaarbo 1996; Budge, Klingemann, Volkens, and Tanenbaum 2001; Clare 2010).

All of this suggests that what goes on inside the “black box” can significantly affect foreign policy in democracies. Moreover, the evidence indicates that democratic peace theorists have overstated the generality of their case. A greater focus is required concerning the monadic hypothesis and variation in foreign policy behavior of democratic states. This paper seeks to contribute to our understanding of democratic foreign policy by examining institutions and

procedures to enhance the causal arguments of democratic peace theory by adding specification and, hence, conditionality.

Theoretical Framework: Institutions, Procedures and Leadership

By viewing all democracies as institutionally and procedurally similar, institutional variations that could affect foreign policy outcomes can be overlooked. Owen (1994) provides some guidance for address this theoretical shortcoming. He argues that democracies should be dichotomized as liberal and illiberal democracies. Owen suggests that liberal democracies are more likely to have pacific foreign policies while illiberal democracies are more likely to pursue aggressive foreign policies. So how do we distinguish between liberal and illiberal democracies? The answer is, as discussed above, we have to take a second look at the monadic hypothesis and peer inside the black box.

Comparative theory has found that patterns of variation exist among advanced, industrialized democracies.¹⁶ Employing a comparative approach, Arend Lijphart (1999) develops a dichotomous typology of democracy. The two ideal democratic models are majoritarian (Westminster) and consensus democracies.¹⁷ He finds that general patterns do exist

¹⁶ For instance, Obinger and Wagschal (2001, 99) examine Castles' four families of nations (i.e. English-speaking, Continental, Scandinavian, and Southern Europe) with respect to public policy-making and find that, "For two policy fields—social and economic—the hypothesized families of nations can be shown to exist, and they are robust and stable over time." Siaroff (1999, 175) develops a measure of corporatism based on the degree of economic integration between the private and public sectors that successfully categorizes states in a manner "which is clearly linear and has no problem cases." Findings such as these suggest that variation does exist among advanced democracies.

¹⁷ The primary categorical devices he utilizes are the executive-party and federal-unitary dimensions. Five differences exist on the executive-party dimension (for all five, traits of majoritarian democracies are listed first):

1. Concentration of executive power in single-party majority cabinets versus executive power-sharing in broad multiparty coalitions.
2. Executive-legislative relationships in which the executive is dominant versus executive-legislative balance of power.
3. Two-party versus multiparty systems.
4. Majoritarian and disproportional electoral systems versus proportional representation.
5. Pluralist interest group systems with a free-for-all competition among groups versus coordinated and "corporatist" interest group systems aimed at compromise and concertation. (p. 3).

Five measures also exist on the federal-unitary dimension (once again, majoritarian traits are listed first):

across democracies based on institutional and procedural structures. In general “the majoritarian model of democracy is exclusive, competitive, and adversarial, whereas the consensus model is characterized by inclusiveness, bargaining, and compromise” (1999, 2). Lijphart finds that not only are consensus democracies the equal of majoritarian democracies regarding decision-making (an oft-cited criticism of consensus democracies), they are also more likely to develop policies that adhere to the democratic principles of equality in outcomes and justice for all.¹⁸

Why would we expect internal procedures to matter? The answer, I suggest, relies on two interrelated factors that determine the distribution of power consistent with institutional structures and procedure, namely, electoral processes and the nature of the executive. Multi-party electoral systems with proportional representation often result in coalition governments that, by nature, lead to wider dispersions of power within the executive. In two-party, winner-take all systems, however, power is structurally more concentrated in the executive. Lijphart (1999, 2) makes note of these conditions when he states that, “The majoritarian model concentrates power in the hands of a bare majority—and often even merely a plurality instead of

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1. Unitary and centralized government versus federal and decentralized governments.
 2. Concentration of legislative power in a unicameral legislature versus division of legislative power between two equally strong but differently constituted houses.
 3. Flexible constitutions that can be amended by simple majorities versus rigid constitutions that can be changed only by extraordinary majorities.
 4. Systems in which legislatures have the final word on the constitutionality of their own legislation versus systems in which laws are subject to a judicial review of their constitutionality by supreme or constitutional courts.
 5. Central banks are dependent on the executive versus independent central banks. (p. 3-4)

¹⁸ Lijphart’s work has spawned research and debate regarding the relationship between institutional and procedural structures and domestic outcomes. For instance, Crepaz (1996, 4) finds that consensus institutions “have favorable effects on unemployment, inflation, and the number of working days lost, whereas economic growth remains unaffected.” Armingeon (2002) agrees with Crepaz’s findings, but disputes Lijphart’s argument that consensus democracies are ‘better, gentler and kinder’ than Westminster democracies. He finds the two systems to be rough equivalents, but does suggest that the economic benefits and the expansive reach of the welfare state lends credence to the notion that majoritarian systems should not be forced upon fledgling democracies. Lijphart (2002) responded to Armingeon’s critique by noting that corporatism and consociationalism can be viewed as similar, hence undermining Armingeon’s argument, and that, at the end of the day, they are not as far apart as Armingeon suggests. Lijphart’s typology, as is the case with all typologies, is based on ideal types. Yet he does effectively group 36 states for the purpose of empirically examining policy outcomes. Interestingly, Flinders 2005 uses Lijphart’s typology as a basis to assess constitutional reform in Britain under the Labour Party from 1997-2005 and finds that despite minor moves towards consensualism, the British system remains majoritarian.

a majority...whereas the consensus model tries to share, disperse, and limit power in a variety of ways.”

Upon closer examination, it becomes clear that the concentration of power, lack of veto points, and competitive/adversarial nature of majoritarian systems can contribute to potential abuse of power based on, as Peterson (1996) notes, the strategic beliefs and/or narrow concerns of the executive. In other words, majoritarian systems may create conditions that allow for the first level of analysis to significantly affect foreign policy outputs. Mayer (1969) argues that domestic politics can be a source of war. Elites may choose to pursue aggressive foreign policies and/or war as a means to limit political resistance at home. As Mayer (1969, 291) notes “(The decision (to go to war) is made by political actors and classes who at critical moments look at the dual field of domestic and international politics.” Hagan (1994) explores the link between regime structure and war-proneness and suggests that domestic political constraints are a “highly variable phenomenon” for democracies as well as other regime types. Moreover, he argues that leadership varies and how leaders view the international environment affects the policies they pursue.

Hermann (2001) explores when and how leaders become “the authoritative decision unit.” The premise of her argument is that strong leaders can be the primary variable when examining international relations. Moreover, Hermann argues that the sensitivity of leadership towards the political context of given situations can significantly increase the impact of leadership on policy. If they are sensitive to the political environment, they are more likely to consider other viewpoints before acting. Those that are less sensitive, the archetype being referred to as crusaders, are more likely to significantly restrict informational input and see opposition as an obstacle to overcome.

Hagan (1994), coming from a similar perspective, creates a leadership typology based on political orientations. He classifies four categories of leadership orientations: moderates, pragmatists, militants, and radicals. Where the ideal types stand in terms of the potential for conflict and cooperation in international relations is represented in Figure 1. The degree of sensitivity to new and potentially dissonant information for the categories is displayed in Figure 2. Moderates hold an optimistic view of the international environment. They do not see the world as inherently dangerous and believe in flexible policies that promote cooperation. The focus on the potential for cooperation implies sensitivity towards information that confirms their **[Both figure 1 and 2 should go here]**

cooperative tendencies yet there is a potential for resistance to data suggesting a harder line should be pursued. Pragmatists perceive a greater level of danger in the international environment, yet “they still have relatively restrained and complex views of the nature of the threats” (Hagan, 1994, 200). They do not write off the possibility of bargaining, compromise, and cooperation. Accordingly, pragmatists are the most sensitive of the ideal types for they are likely to be open to information that may suggest an aggressive, hard-line response is in order as well as input that indicates a cooperative approach is most appropriate.

Militants perceive the world to be full of danger with many countries having “evil” motivations. Leadership with this orientation tends to be less sensitive to the political context and dissonant information during decision-making (i.e. more likely to be crusaders). Bargaining and compromise are seen as naïve to the nefarious ways of enemy countries. Accordingly, militants are more likely to resort to war and other aggressive policies because the “stick,” not the carrot, is the only thing to which threatening states will respond. Radicals go one step further by viewing adversaries as an even greater threat than militants do. They see the entire

international status quo as an evil that must be altered by force and those that support it should therefore be aggressively and violently confronted. This level of ideological rigidity clearly suggests that radicals are highly resistant (i.e. insensitive) towards information that does not fit within their worldview.

Therefore differences in political orientation contribute to variation in data interpretation, the degree to which leaders view the world in in-group/out-group terms, ideological rigidity, policy preferences and war-proneness. The interaction between leadership and institutions can potentially go a long way in explaining foreign policy behavior.

Some research has compared single party and coalition governments and found little variation in foreign policy outputs (Ireland and Gartner 2001; Leblang and Chan 2003; Palmer, London and Regan 2004). This research returns to the subject by including the wider range of variables by using Lijphart's democratic dichotomy based on the logic above. Prins and Sprecher (1999) find that majority coalitions are more war-prone than single party governments. This research returns to such an institutional perspective, but with a more complete institutional picture, and therefore offers the opportunity to test the strength of their finding.

It is clear that variation exists in democracy, political constraints, and leadership. As discussed above, consensus institutional structures appear to constrain leadership more than majoritarian structures. Hence, if leaders rise to power in majoritarian systems that view the international environment as inescapably dangerous, are insensitive to divergent data, and are experiencing political turmoil at home, they will be more likely to implement aggressive foreign policies than in similar cases in consensus democracies. Lijphart also suggests that consensus institutions help develop political cultures that are kinder and gentler and this could affect foreign policy as well. As Lijphart (1999, 298) states, "In the field of foreign policy, one might

plausibly expect the kind and gentle characteristics of consensus democracy to be manifested by generosity in foreign aid and a reluctance to rely on military power.” With all this in mind, there are reasons to believe, based on domestic political characteristics, that consensus democracies are more likely to be what Owen calls liberal democracies while majoritarian democracies, in comparison, are more likely to trend towards being illiberal. Moreover, the interaction between leaders and their institutional environment can influence state behavior. In short, drawing inspiration from Owen and Lijphart and following the advice of Maoz and Russett (1993), this research combines both cultural and structural domains of democratic peace in a manner that can aid in developing a more heterogeneous view of democracy in this area of international relations theory.

Hypotheses and Methods

The most obvious measure of foreign policy aggressiveness is the propensity to use military force. Majoritarian systems concentrate power in the executive and therefore provide a greater opportunity for leaders to implement militarized foreign policies. Consensual systems, on the other hand, provide institutional constraints that limit executive independence.

Accordingly, the first hypothesis is as follows:

- *Hypothesis 1*: Majoritarian democracies and majoritarianism on the executive-parties dimension are more likely to be related to involvement in militarized interstate disputes than consensus democracies and consensualism on the executive-parties dimension.

The sample countries include 23 of the 36 countries used by Lijphart.¹⁹ The countries were selected in part because of their level of economic development in order to limit potential traveling problems based on economic performance, hence the focus on OECD countries. Moreover, the selection process was also based on the potential of states to be involved in militarized disputes. Therefore, small states that have had historic tendencies to avoid disputes were omitted from the sample.²⁰ In addition, the data used provides enough cases for the sample countries, which also addresses the small n problem. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the selection of the sample took into consideration the significance of the Cold War in state foreign policy. As discussed below, this research is interested in the behavior of democracies during periods of international constraint and therefore focuses on the Cold War.

The data utilized here is the Militarized Interstates Disputes (MID) data (Bremer 1996). Because it includes wars *and* militarized disputes (conflicts that involve the threat of military action), this data set provides a larger universe of cases than are contained in the Correlates of War (COW) data set which only contains wars. This choice was also influenced by the assumption that the propensity to resort to the military option, even in cases short of war, does provide an indication of foreign policy aggressiveness.

The sample countries are divided into four categories based on Lijphart's findings: majoritarian democracies, consensus democracies, mixed systems that are majoritarian on the executive parliamentary-dimension (Mixed EP-Maj), and mixed systems that are consensus on the executive-parliamentary dimension (Mixed EP-Con). Table 1 shows where the countries fit

¹⁹ Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.

²⁰ Very small states simply do not have the capacities and/or motivation to be involved in disputes as larger states do (for further explanation, see below discussion regarding the addition of state size as a control variable). This decision rule was also based on the notion that states may have historic legacies that would intervene in or confound the causal relationship between democratic institutions and procedures and foreign policy.

in the categorization strategy. Of Lijphart's two dimensions, because it contains the executive branch which tends to be a critical element in foreign policy decision-making, the executive-parties dimension is most associated with foreign policy. The theoretical prospects for both mixed systems, therefore, are based on the concentration of power in the executive, which explains why I focus on the executive-parties dimension. In other words, the executive-parliamentary dimension has a much more significant role in foreign policy outputs than the federal-unitary dimension. Yet the inclusion of the mixed systems allows for comparisons of these unique institutional systems with each other and majoritarian and consensus states.

[insert Table 1]

The expectations are that executive power and conflict-proneness are positively related, therefore, when executive-parliamentary power sharing is tilted in favor of the executive (i.e. EP-Maj), conflictual foreign policies are more likely. Moreover, since both mixed systems contain some majoritarian and consensus structures, it is also expected that the results for the mixed systems will rest between majoritarianism and consensualism in an ordinal fashion. In short, both mixed systems will be less likely to be involved in militarized disputes than majoritarian systems and more likely than consensus systems. Hence, Hypotheses 2 and 3 are as follows:

- *Hypothesis 2:* Mixed democracies (EP-Maj) are more likely than mixed democracies (EP-Con) to be involved in militarized interstate disputes.
- *Hypothesis 3:* The expectations are that the association between democracy types and likelihood of MID behavior will be ranked from least to most likely in the following order: (1) consensus democracies, (2) mixed democracies (EP-Con), (3) mixed democracies (EP-Maj), (4) majoritarian democracies.

Two time periods are tested. The first period is from 1950-1992. The selection of this time period is purposeful and critical to the analysis. During the Cold War, democratic states aligned themselves against states committed to a competing governmental paradigm, socialism with the goal of communism. Accordingly, the balance of power amongst significant powers was bipolar in nature. As such a configuration is largely a zero-sum game, the intuitive expectation would be that democracies would have been constrained by the international system to such an extent that we should not expect great variation in the foreign policy of democracies. In fact, this is exactly what Farber and Gowa (1995) claim explains why the evidence indicates democracies do not fight one another. If significant variation can occur across democratic types during such a period of international constraint, then the evidence in support of the influence of institutions and procedures on foreign policy would be robust.

1950 is selected as the starting point, for the Cold War was definitively “hot” by that time. Moreover, as the negative effects of World War II were waning, many democratic states were beginning to have the potential to play a greater role in what was occurring outside of their borders. In addition, because a few of sample states did not have established democratic institutions during the entire period, additional analyses are added for a second time period, 1977-1992, as all the sample countries are classified as full democracies by 1976.

The research includes MID counts, time-series-cross-section analysis, and logit analysis to test the hypotheses. Because of the potential influence of intervening variables, counts simply are not enough to confirm the hypotheses. Accordingly, time-series-cross-section analysis is included in this research to control for the effect of such variables. The statistical tests for both periods, however, involve identical methodological techniques.

The model contains potential intervening variables that may affect foreign policy, namely state size, population, gross domestic product (GDP), geographic contiguity, and alliances.²¹

The geographic size of a state could affect the propensity to choose militarized answers to international problems simply because larger states have a greater capacity for projecting force. This factor was taken into consideration when selecting the sample to avoid aberrations brought on by smaller states included in Lijphart's sample. Moreover, state size can be the result of expansionist tendencies of states. Hence, policy legacies may influence a state's behavior in the international environment. Population can also be a resource of the strong, hence influencing foreign policy behavior. Economic resources may affect the ability to engage in interstate conflicts, therefore, GDP is included in the model.

Geographic contiguity also is addressed for the closer states are to one another, the greater the potential that they will be involved in disputes. Accordingly, geographic proximity is included in the model. In order to address island states, this variable is based on conflicts where states share borders as well as conflicts between states where a body of water of less than two hundred miles rests between the countries.²² Finally, alliances are added to the model for they can draw states into conflicts. Two variables are used for the analysis. The first is a dummy variable based on NATO membership. This step addresses the potential impact of the Cold War. The second variable is the number of military alliances to which a state is party.

The time-series-cross-section analysis consists of two groups of four tests. The first group measures democracy by collapsing majoritarian democracies and mixed democracies (EP-

²¹ See Appendix II for construction of variables.

²² Two hundred miles is selected as the distance based on the contention that states often consider waters two hundred miles from their shores to be their economic territorial waters. One exception is included in the dataset, namely the disputes between Britain and Iceland. The reasoning for their inclusion is that although the two countries are more than two hundred miles apart, their disputes over use of the North Atlantic are clearly based on their proximity to one another.

Maj) into one variable based on majoritarianism. Similarly, consensus democracies are combined with mixed democracies (EP-Con) to create a consensus variable. Because of the above-mentioned association between executives and foreign policy, this makes theoretical sense. The majoritarian dummy is then added to the model to test if majoritarianism is statistically related to conflict-proneness for both time periods. The statistical model for these analyses, which tests Hypothesis 1, is as follows:

- $\text{Pr}(\text{militarized interstate disputes}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1(\text{majoritarianism}) + \beta_2(\text{population}) + \beta_3(\text{size/sq.km.}) + \beta_4(\text{GDP}) + \beta_5(\text{number of alliances}) + \beta_6(\text{NATO}) + \beta_7(\text{geographic contiguity})$

The model is tested a second time for both time periods with the addition of dummy variables for the United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel. The decision is based on the United States and the United Kingdom's role as great powers in international affairs. Israel is added because of its uniquely conflictual position in the Middle East. This step helps control for the influence of these outlier states.

The second group of four analyses includes an ordinal democratic variable (majoritarian scale) constructed according to the expectations of Hypothesis 3. The model for two of these tests includes the control variables elaborated on earlier and is as follows:

- $\text{Pr}(\text{militarized interstate disputes}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1(\text{majoritarian scale}) + \beta_2(\text{population}) + \beta_3(\text{size/sq.km.}) + \beta_4(\text{GDP}) + \beta_5(\text{number of alliances}) + \beta_6(\text{NATO}) + \beta_7(\text{geographic contiguity})$

The other two tests of this group of four include the dummy variables for the United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel for the reasons discussed above.

Association with MIDs, however, is only one measure of conflict-proneness. Additional methods, therefore, are added to complement the above analyses to further investigate the hypotheses. To understand more fully how aggressive the foreign policies of democracies are, we need to know the direction of the disputes. In other words, who is starting the MIDs involving democracies? If democracies are merely responding to the hostile actions of other states, then their involvement in disputes is more likely to be defensive rather than aggressive in nature. To address the issue, this research utilizes dyadic analyses of MIDs for 1950-1992 that allow for counts of MIDs instigated with both democracies and non-democracies and logit analysis to assess dispute instigation. Therefore, examining dyads enables a second swipe at the above hypotheses from the perspective of dispute instigation and democratic peace theory's dyadic hypothesis. Additionally, the logit analysis includes a variable for anocracy and, hence provides a brief test of anocratic theory.²³

In sum, the three hypotheses presented here fit into the theoretical framework presented above and the statistical models developed for investigating the hypotheses are appropriate matches for the nature of the data.

Results

MID Counts

To begin, I first turn to counts of militarized interstate disputes for the sample countries based on the MID data. The tallies are presented in Table 2. The results provide the opportunity for an initial discussion of the hypotheses. The data, based on total number of MIDs, support the expectations of Hypothesis 1. Majoritarian democracies have been involved in more militarized interstate disputes than consensus democracies for both time periods. For 1950-1992,

²³ Although full investigation of the anocratic perspectives is not performed here so as to not divert from the primary research questions, some statistical evidence is provided that does confirm the expectations of this literature.

majoritarian democracies averaged 36 MIDs while consensus democracies averaged only 16.29. Majoritarian democracies were also more likely to be involved in militarized interstate disputes for 1977-1992. Even when the modes are dropped, majoritarian democracies are still more likely to be involved in international disputes than consensus democracies.

Hypothesis 2 is also supported by the data. For 1950-1992, mixed democracies (EP-Maj) averaged 53.85 MIDs in comparison to the mixed democracies (EP-Con) average of 21.29 while for the period of 1977-1992 mixed democracies (EP-Maj) averaged over four times as many MIDs as mixed democracies (EP-Con). These findings provide preliminary evidence that leadership can affect the level of interstate conflict in that power is more concentrated in the executive in mixed democracies (EP-Maj) institutional structures.

[insert table 2]

The results, for the most part, do not support Hypothesis 3. Except for mixed democracies (EP-Con) during the 1950-1992 period, the findings for both mixed systems do not rest in between the totals for consensus and majoritarian democracy. One might suspect that Israel and the United States are outliers due to their unique positions in the world, yet when the mode countries for each type of democracy are dropped, mixed democracies (EP-Con) still remain outside of the range between consensus and majoritarian democracies. This suggests two things. First, the fact that dropping the United States allows for mixed democracies (EP-Maj) to fall within the expected range between majoritarian and consensus democracies suggests that the uniquely powerful status of the United States skews the results for this ideal type of democracy. One could argue, however, that it is theoretically plausible to drop the United States as an outlier because of its unique position during the Cold War. If this assumption is accepted, then it could be argued the results do, to at least a certain degree, support Hypothesis 3.

Second, although the average for mixed democracies (EP-Con) does rest in between the totals for the entire time period (1950-1992), the averages are below for 1977-1992 and for both periods when the modes are subtracted. While this does not support Hypothesis 3, it does suggest that executive-parliamentary/leadership consensualism might indeed be a significant factor in reducing interstate conflict. After all, consensus democracies and mixed democracies (EP-Con) are clearly involved in fewer MIDs than both majoritarian democracies and mixed democracies (EP-Maj). This finding supports the most significant theoretical expectations of the framework presented here, namely that consensus democracies are more pacific than majoritarian democracies and concentration of power in the executive increases the potential for conflictual foreign policies.

Time-Series-Cross-Section Analysis

The findings for the first group of four tests, which includes the dummy variable for majoritarianism, are in Table 3. The results for the test of 1950-1992 without the dummy variables for the United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel only offers weak support for Hypothesis 1. The direction of the relationship between MID involvement and majoritarianism is in the expected direction, but is not statistically significant. In the second test of this time period, which includes the controls for the effects of the outlier states of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel (all of which are statistically related to MIDs)²⁴, majoritarianism is associated with a greater likelihood of MID involvement. This finding provides stronger support for Hypothesis 1.

²⁴ Interestingly, the United Kingdom and Israel cease to be statistically related to MIDs during 1977-1992. This finding for the United Kingdom mirrors its diminishing role as a great power. As for Israel, one likely explanation is length of statehood. In other words, by 1977, Israel had successfully defended itself from states that sought its elimination.

[insert Table 3]

The tests for 1977-1992, which is a better test of the effect of democracy on foreign policy since all the states are full democracies, confirm the expectations of Hypothesis 1. Without the state dummy variables, majoritarianism is statistically related to MID involvement at a .05 level of confidence. When the dummy variables are added, the relationship is even stronger with a .001 level of confidence.

The analyses also reveal strong relationships between population size and geographic contiguity and MID involvement, particularly geographic contiguity. This comes as no surprise as proximity intuitively figures to be connected to militarized disputes. The finding regarding population suggests that state power affects state behavior. NATO membership is also related to MID involvement and the relationship becomes stronger during 1977-1992. The finding that NATO membership is associated with interstate conflicts is not shocking, for NATO was the counterbalance to the Warsaw Pact in the Cold War. As for why the relationship becomes stronger over time is the subject for future research, but two potential explanations could be the reactions of member democracies to the fits of the dying Soviet Union and more aggressive US leadership of NATO.

The number of alliances to which democracies belong is not statistically significant for the entire time period, but is negatively related to MID involvement during 1977-1992. This suggests that alliance membership can, but not always, act as a deterrent. GDP, on the other hand, is consistently negatively related to MID involvement. This indicates that prosperous states may be inclined to avoid the negative economic ramifications associated with international conflicts.²⁵ I briefly discuss these findings for the control variables because they deserve

²⁵ Other explanations might be that rich states can afford stronger armed forces and therefore wealth is a form of deterrent or that wealthier states are content with the international status quo.

mention, but full elaboration as to the results for the variables is beyond the scope of this study. The critical point is that they are included in the statistical model and majoritarianism is still related to involvement in MIDs. This, of course, supports the expectations of Hypothesis 1.

[insert Table 4]

The findings for the second set of four tests that include the ordinal majoritarian variable are in Table 4.²⁶ The majoritarian scale is found to be significant for all the tests. These results confirm both Hypothesis 1 and 3, especially Hypothesis 3 for which this test was designed. The findings suggest that moves toward consensualism are associated with more pacific foreign policy outcomes. Conversely, shifts toward majoritarianism are related to more conflictual foreign policies.

Dyadic Analysis, Direction of Dispute, and Democratic Peace Theory's Dyadic Hypothesis

Having reviewed the results for the two time periods above, I now turn to dyadic analysis of the entire period (1950-1992) to determine the direction of disputes and assess the theoretical assertions of democratic peace theory and anocratic studies within the framework of this research. Dyadic analysis captures MID dimensions missed in simple counts that allow for further investigation. It enables an examination of counts and direction of all MID dyads and MID dyads involving other democracies. The process provides the opportunity to test the hypotheses as well as address issues involving democratic peace theory's dyadic thesis. The results for the analysis are in Table 5.

[insert Table 5]

The findings for total number of MID dyads support Hypothesis 1. Majoritarian democracies averaged over twice as many MID dyads as consensus democracies. Hypothesis 2

²⁶ The results for the control variables obviously are nearly identical to the first four analyses, hence they require no further discussion.

is also supported by the results. Mixed democracies (EP-Maj) were in almost three times as many MID dyads as mixed democracies (EP-Con). These findings suggest that the institutional structure of the executive affects foreign policy outcomes and that leadership, within these structures, can play a powerful role in determining state behavior.

Hypothesis 3, however, is only partially confirmed through examination of total MID dyads. The results for mixed democracies (EP-Con) do rest between majoritarian and consensus democracies. The totals for mixed democracies (EP-Maj), however, were the largest of all democracy types. Once again, the extraordinary role of the United States in world affairs apparently affects these outcomes. Yet this does suggest that concentrated power within the executive can contribute to more aggressive foreign policies as majoritarianism is associated with conflict-proneness, even if not entirely in the expected order.

The analyses to this point have only looked at involvement in MIDs or MID dyads. The obvious next question becomes, ‘What is the direction of the dispute?’ Certainly a state cannot be viewed as excessively dispute-prone if it does not instigate the disputes. Clearly it is relevant to know which side is the aggressor. Examination of the direction of the disputes provides evidence, once again, supporting Hypothesis 1. Majoritarian democracies instigated over five times as many MIDs as consensus democracies. Hypothesis 2 is also supported with mixed democracies (EP-Maj) instigating well over twice as many MIDs as mixed democracies (EP-Con). Hypothesis 3, yet again, is only partially supported by the evidence. The findings for mixed democracies (EP-Con) do rest between majoritarian and consensus democracies while mixed democracies (EP-Maj) do not. As discussed directly above, the explanation most likely rest on the role of the United States and concentration of power in the executive.

Turning to democratic peace theory's dyadic hypothesis, it can be seen that democracies do become involved in MIDs with other democracies. This demonstrates Russett's (1993) wisdom in noting that it is best to argue that democracies *rarely*, rather than *never*, engage in wars with other democracies. In fact, it could be suggested that '*less often*' might even be more appropriate than '*rarely*,' at least in the case of MIDs.²⁷ The numbers provide support for Hypothesis 1, with majoritarian democracies averaging 13.75 MIDs with other democracies in comparison to 6.29 for consensus democracies. The same holds true for Hypothesis 2, with mixed democracies (EP-Maj) averaging 20.5 MIDs and mixed democracies (EP-Con) averaging only 6.88.

The evidence, however, only partially supports Hypothesis 3. Mixed democracies (EP-Con) do rest between majoritarian and consensus democracies while mixed democracies (EP-Maj) do not. As has been consistently the case, mixed democracies (EP-Maj) continue to average the most MIDs. Although this does not completely support Hypothesis 3, this, in conjunction with the findings for consensus democracies, does suggest that constrained executive institutional structures can contribute to better relations with other democracies hence providing support for Doyle's institutional explanation for the democratic peace.

A review of the number of instigated MIDs with other democracies provides additional confirmation of Hypothesis 1. Majoritarian democracies averaged five instigated disputes with other democracies (36% of all disputes with democracies) while consensus democracies averaged only 1.29 (21% of all MIDs with democracies). The evidence also largely supports Hypothesis 2, with mixed democracies (EP-Maj) averaging 9.5 instigated MIDs with other democracies (46% of all MIDs with democracies) in comparison to 3.63 (53% of all MIDs with other democracies) for mixed democracies (EP-Con). Interestingly, mixed democracies (EP-

²⁷ Russett was referring to wars, not MIDs, when he suggested the use of the word 'rarely'.

Con) initiate over half of the MIDs involving other democracies. Although this does go against expectations, the fact that they are involved in far fewer MIDs with other democracies than mixed democracies (EP-Maj) indicates a degree of support for Hypothesis 2. The general pattern for Hypothesis 3 appears again as we find that the data for mixed democracies (EP-Con) fitting between and mixed democracies (EP-Maj) resting above the range provided by majoritarian and consensus democracies, at least in terms of averages per sample country. The same explanations come to mind of course, namely the United States and concentrated executive power.

[insert Table 6]

The final test is a logit analysis of the direction of dispute to assess the association of governmental institutional structures and dispute instigation. The results are in table 6. The relationship between consensus democracy and instigation is powerful and in the expected direction. Majoritarian democracies are also negatively associated with instigation, but this relationship is not as strong, hence providing support for Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 2 is not confirmed, but the results for mixed democracies (EP-Con) are only approaching significance, which suggests we are limited in ascribing too much value to this finding. Doing so runs the obvious risk of a false negative. Accordingly, not much can be said of Hypothesis 2. In addition, all that can be said of Hypothesis 3 is that mixed democracies (EP-Maj) fall outside of the range between majoritarian and consensus democracies, a result that, considering the earlier analyses, comes as no surprise.

Interestingly, however, the analysis does indicate that anocracies are positively associated with instigation of MIDs, and the relationship is statistically significant.²⁸ This supports Mansfield and Snyder's (1995) assertion that democratizing states are particularly likely to start conflicts. The association between autocracies and instigation is in the right direction, but is not

²⁸ The fact that the measure for this variable is very rough, these findings should not be considered robust.

statistically significant. Although the findings do not allow for any strong conclusions to be made of autocracies, clearly democracies are associated with a lack of instigating MIDs providing evidence, if somewhat limited, in support of the monadic hypothesis.

Discussion

There are reasons to believe the internal procedures of democracies matter and that politics does not stop at the waters edge. The analyses here suggest that the institutional structures of democracies affect foreign policy outcomes. The evidence consistently indicates that consensus democracies are more pacific than majoritarian democracies as they are less likely to be involved in MIDs with both democracies and non-democracies alike. Moreover, consensus democracies are less likely than majoritarian democracies to instigate MIDs with democracies and non-democracies as well. Consensualism on the executive-parliamentary dimension, the domain most involved with foreign policy, is also associated with less aggressive foreign policies.²⁹

These findings are even more significant when we consider the period under investigation was one of international constraint, the Cold War. The bipolar structure of the Cold War pitted a democratic camp against a powerful, non-democratic coalition of states. The situation was heightened by the potential of nuclear annihilation. Under such conditions, one would expect a great deal of coordination of behavior amongst democracies considering the nature of the threat. Indeed, democracies did form alliances with the NATO being the most significant. Yet in spite of these systemic pressures, democracies displayed significant variation in foreign policy behavior during this period. The findings here associating institutional composition and foreign

²⁹ Not all research has come to similar conclusions. For instance, Kaarbo and Beasley (2008) find that coalition governance is associated with more extreme and committed foreign policy behaviors than single-party governance. Although the independent and dependent variables are distinctly different in scope, such mixed results indicate the debate continues.

policy behavior indicate that domestic-level variables and leadership can significantly influence the foreign policy of democracies even during periods of significant international constraint.

This evidence suggests that institutionally constrained executives do not start or become involved in as many disputes as less restrained leaders. This can be seen in the analyses of majoritarianism and consensualism. The finding is further demonstrated through individual comparisons between majoritarian democracies and consensus democracies and the mixed democracies types. This confirms Auerswald's (1999) findings regarding the "strength" of the executive within democratic institutional structures. In other words, leadership can be a significant variable under the right (or perhaps wrong) institutional conditions. All of this indicates that variations in democratic institutions and procedures really do matter.

Systemic variables are also found to affect state behavior. Population, NATO membership, and proximity are significantly related to MIDs. Moreover, impact of United States on the results for mixed democracies (EP-Maj) further demonstrates that state power can affect state behavior. The findings regarding GDP support the argument that economic development contributes to peaceful relations, suggesting that economics are indeed 'high politics.' That such variables are significant is not a surprise. It was never contended here that systemic or economic variables do not matter. The contention put forth here is that domestic institutional structures and procedures and, to a lesser extent, leadership can have profound effects on what we would all agree is in the realm of high politics, international conflict. The findings of this research demonstrate institutions do affect international conflict and cooperation and therefore must be included within the pantheon of variables associated with high politics.

The findings here are bound to cause debate. Other quantitative studies that focused on comparisons of single-party and coalition governments' foreign policies find no differences in

behavior (Ireland and Gartner 2001; LeBlang and Chan 2003; Palmer, London and Regan 2004).³⁰ Prins and Sprecher (1999) find that coalition majorities are actually more likely to select militarized approaches to foreign policy. Clare (2010) argues that ideology is the key variable in explaining such conclusions. He finds that right-leaning single-party and coalition governments are more conflict-prone than their left leaning counterparts. In terms of the latter argument, this research does not dispute that ideology can influence the foreign policy of democracies. In fact, ideology is cited as a variable that should be considered when investigating foreign policy behavior. Ideology can contribute to the degree to which leaders are war-prone. Clare's findings, therefore, illustrate one of the basic claims made here, namely that democracies need to be viewed in a more heterogeneous fashion when considering democratic peace theory.

As for the lack of variation in foreign policy behavior between single-party and coalition governments, Lijphart's dimensions include a fuller range of factors that contribute to the centralization of power in the executive than simply the single-party vs. coalition distinction. His typology includes interest group systems, executive-legislative relations, and electoral systems, in addition to the five differences on the federal-unitary dimension.³¹ The findings here suggest that these other variables can impact foreign policy.

There is much to unpack in terms of domestic influences on the foreign policy of democracies. Accordingly, future research should investigate a wider range of institutional variables when investigating the effect of domestic institutions on foreign policy. Clare's

³⁰ Ireland and Gartner (2001); Palmer, London, and Regan 20004; and Clark and Nordstrom (2005) do find that minority governments are the least likely to initiate international disputes.

³¹ One could question the inclusion of the federal-unitary dimension in this analysis as these characteristics tend to have domestic rather than international implications. I include them because they are a part of institutional environment of each democratic ideal type. As a result, they may contribute to political culture which, in turn, can affect foreign policy. Moreover, this inclusion is a more complete test of Lijphart's dichotomy and its impact of foreign policy behavior. I do not doubt, however, that the executive-parties dimension is more immediately relevant to foreign policy outputs. In fact, I discuss the importance of the executive in foreign policy decision-making in times of crisis above.

findings indicate that ideology needs to be included in future research as well. It has become increasingly clear that politics do not stop at the water's edge. Research must continue down the path blazed by those who have and continue to disaggregate the democratic peace.

Conclusion

There is a great deal of debate about the nature of the foreign policy of democracies. One growing area of discourse involves variation across democracies. The research presented here indicates that the first and second levels of analysis should be included in discussions of foreign policy. Lijphart's (1999) typology of majoritarian and consensus democracies provides a useful template to assess whether institutional composition affects whether democracies will behave internationally in a liberal or illiberal manner according to Owen's (1994) expectations. The evidence provided here indicates conditions under which democracies may be more likely to pursue aggressive or cooperative foreign policies. In other words, including democratic institutional structures and procedures to the equation adds specification and conditionality to democratic peace theory. The findings also support the notion that institutions may contribute to cultural liberalism, perhaps suggesting both may work in endogenous tandem to contribute to or militate against the pacific qualities of states.

This research contributes to work that incorporates both international relations and comparative theory in a manner that brings these related fields of study together. The growing body of conflict and cooperation literature, which addresses multiple levels of analysis, has added much to our understanding of the foreign policies of democracies by disaggregating the democratic peace (see Putnam 1988; Morgan and Campbell 1991; Risse-Kappen 1991; Owen 1994; Hermann and Kegley 1995; Braumoeller 1997; Auerswald 1999; Gaubatz 1999; Palmer, London, and Regan 2004, Clare 2010). That variation in foreign policy behavior occurred

during a period of international constraint, the Cold War, indicates that in terms of foreign policy, we need to “bring the state back in” (Skocpol, 1985).

In reference to the process of how Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger became the Pope, Maltzman, Schwartzberg, and Sigelman (2006) suggest, “The importance of institutions in structuring human life and decision-making cannot be overstated.” Although this statement is perhaps worded too strongly for the findings of this research, the influence of institutional and procedural structures on the foreign policy of democracies indicate that institutions play a significant role in areas other than the selection of Popes.

Figure 1 Hagan's political orientations displayed on a continuum regarding leadership's perception of the potential for international cooperation.




Figure 2 Hagan's political orientations displayed on a continuum regarding leadership's sensitivity to political contexts and new and potentially dissonant information. Degree of sensitivity decreases as we move from the sensitivity center represented by the circle under the pragmatic orientation.




Table 1 Categorization of democracy based on Lijphart’s executive-parties and federal-unitary dimensions.

Consensus Traits: Federal-Unitary Dimension	<p align="center">Mixed Democracies (EP-Maj)</p> <p align="center">Australia Canada Spain United States</p>	<p align="center">Consensus Democracies</p> <p align="center">Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Switzerland</p>
Majoritarian Traits: Federal-Unitary Dimension	<p align="center">Majoritarian Democracies</p> <p align="center">France Greece New Zealand United Kingdom</p>	<p align="center">Mixed Democracies (EP-Con)</p> <p align="center">Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Norway, Portugal, Sweden</p>
	Majoritarian Traits: Executive-Parties Dimension	Consensus Traits: Executive-Parties Dimension

Table 2 Listing of MID counts for four types of democracy.

1950-1992	Total MIDs	Average # MIDs	Number of States	Mode	Average # of Disputes Minus Mode
Consensus Democracies	114	16.29	7	Japan = 49	10.83
Majoritarian Democracies	144	36	4	UK = 76	22.67
Mixed Democracies (EP-Con)	170	21.25	8	Israel = 104	9.43
Mixed Democracies (EP-Maj)	215	53.85	4	US = 176	13
1977-1992	XXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXX
Consensus Democracies	43	6.14	7	Japan = 14	4.83
Majoritarian Democracies	57	14.25	4	France = 24	11
Mixed Democracies (EP-Con)	40	5	8	Israel = 20	2.86
Mixed Democracies (EP-Maj)	89	22.25	4	US = 68	7

Table 3 Effects on militarized interstate disputes. Dependent variable is the total number of disputes per year, which includes new and continuing disputes. Democracy dichotomized with majoritarian dummy variable.

*p < .05; **p > .01; ***p < .001

Variables	1950-1992 Coefficient (z value)	1950-1992 Coefficient (z value)	1977-1992 Coefficient (z value)	1977-1992 Coefficient (z value)
Majoritarianism	0.32 (1.42)	0.26** (2.63)	0.46* (2.27)	0.65*** (3.98)
Population	0.02*** (7.69)	0.01*** (3.61)	0.02*** (7.00)	0.01*** (3.93)
Size sq. km.	0.03 (0.73)	-0.02 (1.33)	0.03 (0.78)	-0.03 (-1.15)
GDP	-0.00*** (-4.56)	-0.00* (-2.34)	-0.00* (-2.51)	-0.00** (-3.01)
Alliance #	0.02 (0.20)	0.08 (1.20)	-0.45** (-2.69)	-0.65*** (-4.00)
NATO	0.40* (2.34)	0.20* (2.28)	0.81*** (3.82)	0.89*** (5.04)
Contiguity	0.92*** (25.09)	0.88*** (22.75)	1.04*** (11.89)	0.96*** (10.62)
USA dummy	-----	3.78*** (10.91)	-----	4.09*** (6.69)
UK dummy	-----	1.24*** (6.45)	-----	0.25 (0.80)
Israel dummy	-----	0.55* (2.27)	-----	0.34 (1.03)
Constant	0.03 (0.14)	-0.01 (-0.20)	0.13 (0.61)	-0.05 (-0.48)
Overall R-sq	0.70	0.77	0.65	0.73
rho	.18778669	.01273294	.15185294	.06582166

Table 4 Effects on militarized interstate disputes. Dependent variable is the total number of disputes per year, which includes new and continuing disputes. Ordinal measure of democracy in majoritarian scale variable (consensus democracy = 1; mixed democracies EP-Con = 2; mixed democracies EP-Maj = 3; majoritarian democracies = 4).

*p < .05; **p > .01; ***p < .001

Variables	1950-1992 Coefficient (z value)	1950-1992 Coefficient (z value)	1977-1992 Coefficient (z value)	1977-1992 Coefficient (z value)
Majoritarian Scale	0.21* (2.30)	0.11** (2.87)	0.25*** (3.25)	0.25*** (3.88)
Population	0.02*** (7.90)	0.01*** (4.33)	0.02*** (7.37)	0.01*** (4.58)
Size sq. km.	0.03 (0.92)	-0.01 (-0.78)	0.04 (1.19)	-0.00 (-0.15)
GDP	-0.00*** (-4.74)	-0.00* (-2.49)	-0.00* (-2.53)	-0.00** (-3.15)
Alliance #	-0.00 (-0.06)	0.08 (1.32)	-0.46** (-2.75)	-0.63*** (-3.91)
NATO	0.39* (2.31)	0.18* (2.18)	0.78*** (3.82)	0.87*** (4.92)
Contiguity	0.91*** (25.08)	0.87*** (22.64)	1.03*** (11.88)	0.96*** (10.53)
USA dummy	-----	3.62*** (11.31)	-----	3.68*** (6.03)
UK dummy	-----	1.20*** (6.56)	-----	0.18 (0.55)
Israel dummy	-----	0.52* (2.24)	-----	0.25 (0.75)
Constant	-0.65** (-2.86)	-0.18* (-1.97)	-0.73*** (-3.86)	-0.47** (-2.79)
Overall R-sq	0.71	0.77	0.67	0.73
rho	.18972846	.00818472	.13306104	.06822177

Table 5 Dyadic analysis of MID data assessing the number and direction of disputes and the dyadic hypothesis

Democracy Type	Total number of MID dyads / Average per sample country	Number of instigated MIDs / Average per sample country	Number of MID dyads with other democracies / Average per sample country	Number of instigated MIDs with other democracies / Average per sample country	Percentage of MIDs as instigator with other democracy
Consensus Democracies	125 / 17.86	19 / 2.71	44 / 6.29	8 / 1.29	21%
Majoritarian Democracies	177 / 44.25	62 / 15.5	55 / 13.75	20 / 5	36%
Mixed Democracies EP-Con	194 / 24.25	83 / 10.38	55 / 6.88	29 / 3.63	53%
Mixed Democracies EP-Maj	260 / 65	104 / 26	82 / 20.5	38 / 9.5	46%

Table 6 Dyadic logit analysis of dispute instigators. Classification system based on Polity III dataset and research sample; disputes drawn from MID dataset.

*Autocracies: = or < -7 on polity scale.

*Anocracies: = or > -6 and = or < 6 on polity scale.

Dispute Instigator	z	P> z
Autocracies	1.49	0.135
Anocracies	4.27	0.000
Consensus Democracies	-6.44	0.000
Majoritarian Democracies	-3.32	0.001
Mixed Democracies EP-Con	-1.58	0.113
Mixed Democracies EP-Maj	-2.50	0.012

Appendix I

Appendix Table 1: Matrix of dyad counts for disputes for 1950-1992. Classification system based on Polity III dataset and research sample; disputes drawn from MID dataset.

*Autoc (autocracies): = or < -7 on polity scale.

*Anoc (anocracies): = or > -6 and = or < 6 on polity scale.

*Democ (democracies): = or > 7 on polity scale.

*Con Democ (consensus democracies), Maj Democ (majoritarian democracies), Mixed Democ EP-Con (mixed democracies EP-Con), and Mixed Democ EP-Maj (mixed democracies EP-Maj) represent the 23 sample countries.

Political Institutions	Autoc	Anoc	Democ	Con Democ	Maj Democ	Mixed Democ EP-Con	Mixed Democ EP-Maj
Autoc	526	255	180	45	90	106	140
Anoc	255	114	95	36	32	33	38
Democ	180	95	114	38	38	37	59
Con Democ	45	36	38	2	0	1	3
Maj Democ	90	32	38	0	2	9	6
Mixed Democ EP-Con	106	33	37	1	9	4	4
Mixed Democ EP-Maj	140	38	59	3	6	4	10

Appendix II

Variables for time-series-cross-section analysis: population source, UN Demographic Yearbook; territorial size source, CIA World Factbook; GDP source, Penn World Tables Version 6.1 (GDP per capita x population).

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