

Gender, Voting and Cosponsorship in the Maine State Legislature

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Abstract

The prediction that women in politics ought to support bills deemed "women-friendly" more often than men is methodologically questionable, relying on operationalizations of women-friendliness that at times break with women's own articulation of their interests. OLS analysis of voting and cosponsorship in the 124th and 125th Maine State Legislatures fails to consistently empirically support this individual-level hypothesis. A relational analysis of lawmakers in pairs avoids prior assumptions about which bills women ought to support, more broadly assessing the extent of cooperation along gender lines for men and women across bills of all sorts. MRQAP regression applied bills in the 124th and 125th Maine State Legislatures reveals that neither men nor women in the legislature tend to vote or cosponsor simply along lines of gender. Rather, gendered cooperation manifests itself differently in different years, different parties and different chambers to a different extent for men than for women.

Introduction

Most research on gender in legislative politics attempts to answer Hanna Pitkin's question in *The Concept of Representation* (1967): Does the descriptive presence of women in legislatures lead to the substantive representation of women's interests in legislation? That question is still empirically unresolved 19 years after the "Year of the Woman" in U.S. Congressional elections. While some research finds that women legislators are significantly more likely than men to originate or support a slate of feminist or "women's issue" bills (Bratton and Haynie 1999; Hogan 2008; Saint-Germain 1989; Swers 2002; Swers 2005; Welch 1985), a significant minority of research finds no significant difference in support between women and men in the legislature (Barnello 1999; Reingold 2000; Vega and Firestone 1995) or that gender differences hold only for some "women's issue" bills but not others (Swers 1998).

The consideration of women's descriptive and substantive representation is not only empirically unresolved but also confronts three varieties of theoretical difficulty. First, the identification of distinct and enduring women's interests has been a problematic task. Despite diligent work to identify what women's legislative interests ought to be theoretically (Gilligan 1982; Sapiro 1981) or to document what women legislators are interested in empirically (Carroll 2001, Dodson 2006, Reingold 1992; Thomas and Welch 1991), it is possible for any list of ideal women's interests to be incomplete or contrary to patterns of interests reported by women (Reingold 2000). Conservative women and liberal feminists issue competing claims regarding the nature of "women's interests" that are at times mutually inconsistent (Celis and Chids 2011); as Carroll (2001, 4) points out, the application of a mothering ethic of care to the issue of abortion might result in the endorsement of parental consent requirements, although that position is characterized by most feminist theorists as inimical to women's interests.

Some problems with identifying a platform of women's interests are illustrated by the Caiazza's (2004) construction of a multidimensional index of "women-friendly policy" to match the platform of the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995. Caiazza finds that Democratic women's presence in a state legislature is a powerful predictor of a state's women-friendliness measured in this way, but also that Republican women's presence has a statistically insignificant effect. A separate factor analysis of the index fails to find statistical coherence in the Beijing platform when applied to state legislative output (Cowell-Meyers and Langbein 2006).

More broadly, if a single set of women's interests is articulated in politics, then women across parties should be more alike in their approach than men across parties, but Hogan (2008) finds that Democratic women and Republican women in state legislatures are more unlike ideologically than Democratic men and Republican men. Are women state legislators in either the Republican Party or the Democratic Party suffering from false consciousness about their fundamentally unified interests as a class (Lukács [1923] 1972)? Do differences by party reflect the division of women into contingent classes with occasionally intersecting but often distinctive interests (Collins 1993)? Or does this disjuncture document a change in the domain of women's legislative interests that intellectuals ought to track as indicative of broader social changes (Barnello and Bratton 2007)? When the nature of women's interests is theoretically contested or empirically inconsistent, it may not be clear which bills promote women's interests and which bills restrain them.

Second, women may act jointly in legislatures for reasons that have everything to do with gender but little to do with the rational pursuit of interests. For instance, the disproportionate propensity of people to interact with others of the same gender, called gender homophily, has

been noted in various social contexts, including the legislature (Caldeira and Patterson 1987; Cook 2000; McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook 2001). Once established, gendered social ties may act as a conduit along which support for a policy spreads, even when the policy itself has little to do with gender directly (Caldeira and Patterson 1987; Stucky et al. 2008). In this case, imputing women's interests from the list of policies advocated by women legislators could mistake patterns of diffusion for reasons.

Third, if we speak only of women and their interests when considering the effect of gender in politics, then at least half the story is missed, since women are not the only people with gender (Lovenduski 1998). If women's interests and women's issue bills are generated out of interpersonal interactions or on the basis of their unique position vis-à-vis social institutions, then men's interests and men's issue bills can also be expected to exist, since men also interact with individuals and encounter institutions (Reingold 2000). Men's issues are not necessarily just the issues that are not women's issues; some issues may be both women's issues and men's issues, other issues may be gender-neutral, and these boundaries may change over time (Barnello and Bratton 2007; Carver 1996). To consider only women's gendered behavior is to reduce the variation in the phenomenon to be explained.

The goal of this article is to both assess and address the problems in studying gender in legislatures through the lens of "women's interests." First, I adopt the prevailing individual-centered approach to ask whether women members of the 124th and 125th Maine State Legislatures are more likely than their male counterparts to support bills consistent with the "women-friendly" policies identified in feminist scholarship, both overall and for substantive subsets of the "women-friendly" platform. Second, I apply a relation-centered approach to studying gender in legislatures. Instead of asking whether individual women in a state legislature

support women's interests by supporting bills coded as "women-friendly," I ask whether members of a pair in the state legislature co-operate along gender lines. If we consider any same-sex pair in the state legislature, be they two women or two men, do we find that they are more likely to support the same bills and to cast the same roll call votes than a cross-gender pair?

This second question treats gendered collaboration as a relational phenomenon that encompasses behavior of both men and women and allows for gender similarities that may or may not have to do with the pursuit of interests. Instead of taking responsibility for determining what men's and women's interests in state legislatures ought to be, the relational approach adopts substantive agnosticism and asks the more open question of whether and when legislators are acting in gender-similar fashion at all.

Data and Methodology

The Context of Maine

Maine has a history of strong political representation by women. Margaret Chase Smith of Maine was the first woman to serve in both the U.S. House and Senate and the first woman considered for the U.S. presidential nomination (University of Maine 2011). Of Maine's four U.S. Senators and Representatives in the current 112th Congress, three are women. Critical mass theory predicts that "transformation of a state legislature by women will be more likely to occur when women constitute at least a substantial minority (20–30 percent) of its members" (Camissa and Reingold 2004, 196; Kanter 1977). In the 125th Maine State Legislature, 29.8% of the House and 20.0% of the Senate are women, a relatively high share that as Figure 1 shows is part of a long-term trend (Maine State Legislature 2011a). The Maine State Legislature meets and at times has exceeded this critical mass for the differential expression of policy preference by gender. All of these factors suggest a political body and climate receptive to political

participation by women as well as men, a place in which women may engage in "critical acts" that shape policy (Childs and Krook 2008).

To assess the legislative expression of gender in Maine, this article analyzes both voting and cosponsorship. Roll call voting is usually the final consequential action of a legislative body upon a measure, determining whether it passes or fails. 789 roll call votes in the Maine House and 499 roll call votes in the Maine Senate from 2009 to 2011 are counted here. Legislative leadership is expressed early in the history of a bill through the affirmative act of bill sponsorship or cosponsorship, referred to by Swers (2005) as "loud voting" for its expression of high commitment to a new and untested idea (see also Wilson and Young 1997). Tamerius (1995, 248) asserts that legislative feminism is expressed not in the act of final roll call voting on bills making it to the floor but rather in patterns of advocacy for different sets of bills to be considered in the first place. Cosponsorship occurs commonly in the Maine State Legislature, with at least 1 cosponsor and as many as 43 cosponsors signing on alongside a primary sponsor for 2,785 of the 3,420 bills before the Maine State House and Senate between 2009 and 2011; 21,725 acts of sponsorship or cosponsorship in all were registered during that period.

To assess the impact of gender in different political contexts, this article collects data from both the 124th Legislature of 2009-2010 and the 1st session of the 125th Legislature ending in June of 2011. Following trends across these years has analytical value. While the House and Senate of the 124th Legislature were under the control of a Democratic majority, the House and Senate of the 125th Legislature were led by a Republican majority. In the 124th Legislature, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House and 12 committee chairs were women. In the 125th Legislature, only 6 committee chairs were women and both the President and Speaker were men. A change in the effects of gender between these legislatures would indicate a primacy of

context; stability of effects despite this dramatic change would indicate patterns of gender resistant to the demands of party and leadership.

Individual Model: Men, Women & "Women-Friendly" Policy

Do Maine's women legislators support "women-friendly" policy more often than its men legislators? An individual level analysis to answer this question operationalizes the dependent variable as the number of votes or cosponsorships by a legislator in favor of "women-friendly" policy. Caiazza (2004) developed a set of criteria for women-friendly policy with reference to the platform of the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995; women-friendliness or unfriendliness is measured by that standard here. Table 1 displays the count of bills coded as women-friendly in each of substantive seven categories. Roll calls on bills coded as women-unfriendly are indicated in parentheses; votes against the passage of these bills are counted as women-friendly votes. Regressions predicting cosponsorship include all 188 members of the House and Senate; the Passamaquoddy and Penobscot representatives to the Maine House do not have voting privileges and therefore are not included in regressions predicting roll call voting.

When operationalizing independent variables, party and gender are coded as interacting dichotomous variables (with male Republicans as the null category) to account for the possibility that men and women of each party may have different patterns of support for these policies.¹ To account for differences in the environment by chamber and within chamber by cohort, variables for chamber (with Maine Senate as the null category) and years of tenure in the legislature are included as controls. Also included as control variables are various characteristics of House and Senate districts taken from Census data (U.S. Census Bureau 2010) including the percent of

¹ When party and gender are operationalized as separate dummy variables without interaction, the effect of gender is more frequently insignificant than when party and gender are allowed to interact. Results available upon request.

district residents that are urban, nonwhite, female, and in same-sex partnerships, as well as median age for a district and whether college dormitories or military quarters are located within the district.

Relational Model: Gender Similarity in Legislature Pairs

Even if support for selected "women-friendly" bills before the Maine State Legislature is not associated with gender, broader gender-specific cooperation in legislating might occur for a variety of reasons, and in different ways for men and for women, and to a different extent among Democrats and Republicans. These are possibilities couched in the language of relations rather than individual propensity, assessed by observing pairs of legislators rather than legislators acting alone (Fowler 2006). Relational analysis in this paper adopts two different dependent variables: the number of votes in the same direction by a pair of legislators and the number of joint cosponsorships by that pair.

The focal independent variable here is gender similarity, with the main effect operationalized as a pair of dichotomous variables to estimate the impact of gender similarity separately for dyads of men (1=both men) and of women (1=both women) to account for the possible differences in the salience of gender for men and women. Additional independent variables include a pair of dichotomous variables to account for separate effects of party similarity for Republicans (1=both Republican) and Democrats (1=both Democrat). When interaction terms for gender similarity and party similarity are introduced, the null category consists of legislator pairs of both different genders and different parties. These interaction terms are included to account for the possibility that gender similarities manifest themselves either within existing party structures or as a way of bridging party differences (Caiazza 2004; Hogan 2008; Reingold 2000; Swers 2005). The number of committee assignments shared between two

legislators is included in regression models since legislators may be more likely to cosponsor bills to which they are exposed through committee consideration (Swers 2005), and because legislators may be more inclined to cooperate with the peers they spend extra time with in committee (Cook 2000; Fowler 2006). Shared years of tenure in the Maine State Legislature is included to signify the duration of personal contact between legislators. Shared occupational background is a dichotomous variable that includes categories for agriculture and forestry, education, health, legal and law enforcement, real estate, small business and student. A dichotomous variable to indicate adjacent districts in pairs accounts for the tendency of such districts to hold similar constituencies and face similar issues.

Because the unit of analysis in this research is the dyadic relationship between two legislators rather than the behavior of a monadic individual legislator, a research method suitable for dyadic cases must be employed. In the first step of Multiple Regression Quadratic Assignment Procedure (MRQAP) regression, an OLS regression is run in which the $n*(n-1)$ number of dyads generated by the set of n legislators is organized into a $n*n$ matrix (Krackhardt 1987). Each variable is represented by a different matrix in which each cell contains information about the relationship between two legislators. For the 35 members of the Maine Senate, 1190 cases result in each of the 124th and 125th Legislatures, and for the 153 members of the Maine House, 23,256 cases result (two of the members of the Maine House occupy seats for Native American constituencies and have cosponsorship powers but no voting powers, so when House voting is the dependent variable, only 22650 cases result).

Calculating standard errors to determine the statistical significance of these OLS coefficients would lead to biased results since cases are made up of all possible pairs of legislators and one legislator will be part of many pairs. As a result, cases are not independent of

one another; in response MRQAP regression repeatedly and randomly permutes rows and columns of the dependent variable matrix and re-computes OLS regression coefficients from the permuted matrices (Borgatti, Everett and Freeman 2002; Dekker et al. 2007). For this study, 2000 random permutations were carried out for each MRQAP regression. Statistical significance is indicated as the proportion of results from randomly altered matrices with OLS coefficients as high as those from the original dependent variable matrix of unpermuted data; a proportion of .05 or less is considered statistically significant.

Results and Discussion

Individual Models

Regression results presented in Tables 2 and 3 show not only that the impact of gender is outweighed by party, but also that within party gender has an inconstant effect. Republican women of the 124th Legislature cosponsor approximately one more woman-friendly bill on average than Republican men, a statistically significant difference. But in the 125th Legislature, no significant cosponsorship difference between Republican women and Republican men appears. When it comes to women-friendly voting, neither the 124th nor the 125th Legislature evince a significant difference between Republican women and Republican men. In the 125th Legislature, Republican women even appear to vote in women-friendly fashion less often than Republican men, albeit to a non-significant extent. These findings are not consistent with the hypothesis that women represent women's interests, at least given the assumptions Caiazza makes about the nature of women's interests.

In all models, Democrats act in women-friendly fashion more often than Republicans, and in all models save one Democratic women support more women-friendly bills than Democratic men. These results provide partial support for the women's-interests hypothesis.

But in further contradiction of that hypothesis, Democratic men in the 125th Legislature cosponsor more women-friendly bills than Democratic women. Controlling for contextual variables, Democratic women in that legislature are not significantly more inclined to cosponsor more women-friendly bills than Republican men. Statistical significance aside, the substantive difference between Democratic women and Democratic men in voting and cosponsorship is small, dwarfed by interparty variation.

Finally, Tables 2 and 3 show that the ability of party and gender to explain the number of women-friendly policies supported by a legislator varies by the type of action being studied. Legislator party and gender together explain nearly half of variation in the number of women-friendly roll call votes cast by that legislator. But the same variables explain only a fifth of the variation in the number of acts to cosponsor women-friendly bills, indicating that cosponsorship in the Maine State Legislature is much less constrained along these lines than voting.

The multiple regression models presented in Tables 2 and 3 assess whether women are more likely than men to support women-friendly bills overall; are these results consistent across the various policy subdomains of the Beijing-based index, or do they further vary? To answer this question, separate regressions are run to predict the number of women-friendly actions in four domains: 1) domestic violence, 2) sexual orientation, 3) economic policy, and 4) a residual category including the status of women, reproduction, child support and sexual assault. Results from these analyses are shown in Table 4. Some combinations of domain, session and action type contained no votes or cosponsorships during a particular legislature and therefore were not subject to analysis.

Of 13 regression models representing some combination of type of action, legislature and policy domain, 11 reveal an insignificant difference between Republican women and men, and

three contain an insignificant effect of both being a Republican woman and of being a Democratic woman. In nine out of these 13 models, Democratic women take a greater number of women-friendly actions than Democratic men, but in four out of 13 models the converse is true. Only two out 13 models, both regarding cosponsorship in the 124th Legislature, wholly support the hypothesis that women are more likely to support women-friendly bills than men, with a significant positive effect of being a Republican woman and a significant positive effect of being a Democratic woman. All other models contain some deviation from that hypothesis, the form of which varies between voting and cosponsorship, between the 124th and 125th legislatures, and between different domains of supposedly "women-friendly" policy.

The two best-predictive sets of effects are seen in voting on issues of sexual orientation and economics; the interaction of party and gender predict more than half of the variation in economic voting, for instance. But issues of sexual orientation and economics are the two policy domains with the most tenuous connection to women in particular. Minimum wage hikes, expanded disability insurance and strengthened unemployment benefits, all noted by Caiazza as "women-friendly" policies, impact working men as well as working women. The prohibition of gender identity discrimination, the enactment of hate crimes law with sexual orientation provisions, and the legalization of same-sex marriage impact gay men as much as they do lesbian women. Conversely, support for legislation having to do directly with the status of women, reproduction, child support and sexual assault is poorly predicted by gender and party.

Amidst this variability in outcomes, three conclusions seem tenable. First, in the Maine State Legislature women do not appear to be acting as a single cohesive group to enact a set of policies considered to be "women-friendly" by academics and activists. Indeed, the preponderance of results suggests that Republican women in the legislature are as opposed to

these "women-friendly policies" as are Republican men. Second, while it is notable that overall Democratic women are the most likely group to support "women-friendly" policies in the legislature, the difference Democratic women and Democratic men is negligible. "Women-friendly" policies are nearly as strongly supported by Democratic men as by Democratic women, occasionally more strongly by Democratic men than by Democratic women, and consistently far more strongly by Democratic men than by Republican women, suggesting that these policies represent a partisan set of priorities more than a set of interests uniquely articulated by women. Third, confirming Cowell-Meyers and Langbein (2006), patterns of gendered support differ between different policy domains gathered under the general banner of "women-friendly," suggesting women's interests cannot be reduced to a single dimension, at least in this legislative sphere.

Relational Models

Regression results presented in Tables 5 and 6 indicate that the impact of shared gender on joint political action in the 124th and 125th Maine State Legislature is not uniform but contingent, differing for men and women in different contexts and between voting and cosponsorship. Controlling for party, region, committee, occupation and tenure similarities, women of the same gender do not vote in the same direction significantly more than legislator pairs of different genders if they cross party lines or are both in the Republican party; only pairs of Democratic women vote together significantly more often controlling for other factors. House men who share party identification with one another are significantly less likely to cooperate than cross-gender pairs within or between the parties; this effect is the opposite of what theories of gender solidarity would predict. These contingent findings are dwarfed by the effect of shared party on voting. In all years and in both houses Democrats vote at least a hundred times more

often with Democrats than they do with Republicans, and Republicans vote at least a hundred times more often with Republicans than they do with Democrats.

If voting is a highly partisan activity, cosponsorship is considerably less partisan; the R-squared statistic is far lower for models predicting cosponsorship than for models predicting voting, indicating that the act of supporting a bill is less constrained than the act of passing a bill. Party similarity significantly shapes but does not largely determine cosponsorship, allowing other factors to play a role. In both the House and Senate, the effect of shared gender differs for women and men, for Republicans and Democrats, for the 124th versus the 125th Legislature. In the House of the 124th Legislature, Republican women jointly cosponsor the most bills, with cross-party pairs of women and pairs of Democratic women next most likely to cosponsor bills together. Republican women in the House of the 125th Legislature are also more likely than other groups to jointly cosponsor more bills, but Democratic women and cross-party pairs of women do not cosponsor significantly more bills than other groups do. In the Senate of the 124th legislature, Democratic and cross-party pairs of women jointly cosponsor more bills, but Republican women do not cosponsor together more often. In the 125th legislature, none of these kinds of pairs of women cosponsored a significantly greater number of bills than other legislators.

The pattern by which women cooperate with women to initiate policies in the Maine legislature may vary, but the pattern of non-cooperation among men is striking. Across all combinations of party, chamber and year, only pairs of Democratic men in the 125th Senate and pairs of Republican men in the 125th House cosponsor bills together significantly more often than cross-gender pairs or pairs of women. Gender appears to be largely inactivated as a basis of joint cosponsorship for men in the Maine legislature.

Effects among the control variables, while not of direct relevance to the subject of gender in the state legislature, are worthy of note in their own right. While the overwhelming determinant of joint voting in the House and Senate is shared party, shared committee membership has a stronger positive effect on cosponsorship than party in the House and an effect comparable to party in the Senate. Members with adjoining districts also consistently cosponsor more bills than members whose districts are distant from one another, indicating the importance of localism. Shared occupational background has a consistently positive but only sporadically significant effect on joint action. Finally, the number of years of tenure shared by two legislators is not associated with the extent of cooperation between them; spending time together does not bring legislators into alliance.

Conclusion

Are women in the Maine State Legislature more inclined to support "women-friendly" bills than men? Not consistently across party; the more accurate answer is that Democrats do. If we dismiss assumptions about which bills women ought to support and men ought not to support, do we find that members of the House and Senate in the Maine State Legislature more broadly cooperate along lines of gender? The answer, more complicated than a simple "yes" or "no," is that the impact of gender is different for men and women, different in the House and Senate, different for the actions of voting and cosponsorship, and different between the 124th and 125th Legislatures. Voting fell sharply along party lines, leaving little opportunity for variation by gender. In the House, Republican women were most likely to cosponsor together in the 124th Legislature but Republican men were most likely to cosponsor together in the 125th Legislature. In the Senate, Democratic women most strongly cosponsored together in the 124th Legislature but Democratic men most strongly cosponsored together in the 125th Legislature.

It is worthy of note that the most commonly activated joint party-gender cooperation occurs between pairs of Democratic women, just as the most common group of individual legislators to support "women-friendly" policy is Democratic women. This trend, while small and at times utterly reversed, indicates that there is at least a potentiality for some women in politics to act in alignment with the interests that feminist theorists argue ought to motivate them. But if these interests drive Democratic women legislators in the same way at times, the pattern cannot be taken for granted; it can only be seen as a potentiality manifesting in reality at some times, in some circumstances, and in some varieties of action. Whether and how cooperation among Democratic women activates may be a question for future qualitative research, generating rich case-specific detail; no broad and consistent pattern for Democratic women is generated by the quantitative research described here.

Why does gender seem to impact legislative behavior in such a varying fashion, a fickle breeze rather than a mighty wind blowing through the Maine State Legislature? Why does the gendered basis of individual action and relational interaction flicker in and out of significance, not only in Maine, but in other American legislatures as well? It is possible that varying results represent the failure of past and current research to hit upon an important operationalization or methodology that will bring the literature's disparate results into alignment. It is also possible that the disparate results reflect a disparate reality. It could be that over a longer period of time than the three years studied here, the propensity of legislators to co-operate along gender lines has accelerated or decelerated. It could be that gender similarity activates more strongly within political structures that bring people generally together, such as committee or locality; but we should suspect that effect might vary between chambers and years as well. If gender is not a physical characteristic set in concrete, not a durable unidimensional class created by persistent

differences in conditions, but rather a mutable social entity constantly recreated through social interaction in institutions (Risman 2004; Smith-Lovin and McPherson 1993; West and Zimmerman 1987), then we should not be surprised to find that gender varies in its meaning and impact across institutions and within institutions across time as the constraints of the institutions change. In this light, legislative research on gender may not be so much a quest to find an immutable law of politics as it is a reading of a barometer to track changing sociological conditions.

FIGURE 1

Percent Women Elected to Maine State
Senate and House, 1988-2010




TABLE 1

Indicators of Women-Friendly Policy in the 124th and 125th Maine State Legislature,
Caiazza 2004 Coding Scheme from Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995

Issue	Women-Friendly Positions	# Women-Friendly Bills, 124 th Legislature	# Women-Friendly Bills, 125 th Legislature
Domestic Violence	more training, criminalization, more spending against	11	4
Sexual Assault	more training, criminalization, more spending against	2	11
Status of Women	avored status for women in law	6	0
Reproduction	sex education, infertility coverage, public funding for contraception and abortion, lack of waiting period or parental consent for abortion	0	1 (4)
Child Support	more collection	6	2
Sexual Orientation	prohibition of gender identity discrimination, hate crimes law, same-sex marriage	2	0 (1)
Economy	gender pay equity, higher minimum wage, disability and unemployment insurance, family leave and welfare benefits	7 (1)	8

Note: # of Roll-Call Votes on Women-Unfriendly Bills in Parentheses

TABLE 2

Results of OLS Regression Analyses Predicting Cosponsorship of Women-Friendly Bills in the
124th and 125th Maine State Legislatures

All Bills (standard error in parentheses)

Dependent Variable	124 th Legislature		125 th Legislature	
Intercept	0.617*	-0.667	0.487*	2.503
	(0.193)	(5.412)	(0.122)	(3.689)
Republican Woman	0.967*	1.008*	-0.052	-0.005
	(0.473)	(0.477)	(0.256)	(0.249)
Democratic Man	1.302*	1.317*	0.781*	0.630*
	(0.260)	(0.291)	(0.189)	(0.212)
Democratic Woman	1.693*	1.624*	0.545*	0.432
	(0.301)	(0.323)	(0.230)	(0.251)
Tenure		-0.049		0.079*
		(0.058)		(0.032)
House		0.509		-0.290
		(0.306)		(-0.222)
District % Urban		0.004		-0.030
		(0.005)		(0.330)
District % Nonwhite		0.036		0.008
		(0.067)		(0.047)
District % Female		-0.051		-0.449
		(0.113)		(7.758)
District % Same-Sex Partners		0.268		0.618
		(0.467)		(0.323)
College Dorm in District		-0.055		0.151
		(0.291)		(0.204)
Military Quarters in District		-0.156		0.029
		(0.431)		(0.297)
Median Age		0.092*		-0.057
		(0.044)		(0.030)
R ²	.17	.22	.10	.21
N	188	188	188	188

*p ≤ .05

TABLE 3

Results of OLS Regression Analyses Predicting Women-Friendly Roll Call Votes in the 124th and 125th Maine State Legislatures

All Bills (standard error in parentheses)

Dependent Variable	124 th Legislature		125 th Legislature	
Intercept	2.655*	6.469	3.462*	1.841
	(0.180)	(2.794)	(0.224)	(6.737)
Republican Woman	0.345	0.189	-0.722	-0.663
	(0.436)	(0.245)	(0.470)	(0.455)
Democratic Man	2.250*	2.166*	2.985*	3.060*
	(0.241)	(0.153)	(0.347)	(0.387)
Democratic Woman	2.654*	2.454*	3.538*	3.642*
	(0.279)	(0.168)	(0.420)	(0.458)
Tenure		-0.056		-0.065
		(0.030)		(0.058)
House		-2.914*		-1.253*
		(0.157)		(-0.405)
District % Urban		0.001		-0.007
		(0.002)		(0.007)
District % Nonwhite		0.003		0.133
		(0.035)		(0.086)
District % Female		-0.062		0.119
		(0.058)		(0.142)
District % Same-Sex Partners		0.001		-0.011
		(0.240)		(0.590)
College Dorm in District		-0.056		0.164
		(0.149)		(0.373)
Military Quarters in District		-0.315		0.628
		(0.221)		(0.541)
Median Age		0.003		-0.088
		(0.023)		(0.055)
R ²	.41	.83	.43	.50
N	186	186	186	186

*p ≤ .05

TABLE 4

The Impact of Gender on Women-Friendly Voting and Cosponsorship by Subject Domain
(standard error in parentheses)

	Voting		Cosponsorship	
	124 th	125 th	124 th	125 th
Domestic Violence				
Intercept	-- ¹	-- ⁴	0.190 (0.100)	0.039 (0.043)
Republican Woman			0.477* (0.242)	0.048 (0.090)
Democratic Man			0.270* (0.134)	0.179* (0.067)
Democratic Woman			0.382* (0.155)	0.219* (0.080)
R ²			0.04	0.06
N			188	188
Economics				
Intercept	1.086* (0.088)	0.040* (0.046)	-0.069 (0.073)	0.065 (0.073)
Republican Woman	0.080 (0.212)	-0.039 (0.097)	-0.069 (0.176)	-0.021 (0.151)
Democratic Man	1.454* (0.117)	1.652* (0.072)	0.255* (0.097)	0.553* (0.113)
Democratic Woman	1.628* (0.135)	1.832* (0.087)	0.193 (0.112)	0.322* (0.136)
R ²	0.55	0.82	0.05	0.13
N	186	186	188	188
Sexual Orientation				
Intercept	-- ²	-- ²	-- ²	-- ⁵
Republican Woman	-2.160	-0.872	-2.398	
Democratic Man	1.061 (0.794)	-0.686 (0.604)	1.299 (0.814)	
Democratic Woman	3.615* (0.523)	2.524* (0.441)	1.844* (0.526)	
Chi Square	5.873* (1.100)	3.580* (0.771)	1.316* (0.584)	
N	118.286*	79.897*	15.880*	
N	186	186	188	
Status of Women, Reproduction, Child Support and Sexual Assault				
Intercept	-- ³			
Republican Woman	1.889* (0.048)	2.831* (0.163)	0.466* (0.158)	0.377* (0.081)
Democratic Man	0.011 (0.113)	-0.396 (0.340)	0.868* (0.381)	-0.072 (0.168)
Democratic Woman	0.028 (0.064)	0.860* (0.253)	0.764* (0.211)	0.005 (0.125)
R ²	0.001 (0.073)	1.137* (0.305)	1.320* (0.244)	0.010 (0.151)
N	0.002	0.13	0.15	0.001
N	151	186	188	188

*p ≤ .05

¹ no roll call votes in this domain

² logistic regression for dichotomous dependent variable (only one bill in domain)

³ House only; no Senate votes in this domain

⁴ insufficient degrees of freedom; only a 33-2 Senate vote in this domain, no House vote

⁵ no women-friendly legislation in this domain

TABLE 5

Results of QAP Regression Analyses Predicting Shared Legislative Decisions
in the Maine House (standardized coefficients in parentheses)

Dependent Variable	# Votes in Common				# Cosponsorships in Common			
	124	124	125	125	124	124	125	125
Intercept	218.737	-86.767	108.473	-35.235	4.261	-2.23	1.931	-1.955
Both Women	25.283* (0.097)	0.045 (0.000)	1.775 (0.008)	0.945 (0.005)	1.504* (0.102)	0.842* (0.057)	0.002 (0.000)	0.200 (0.017)
Both Men	-6.220 (-0.041)	7.372* (0.050)	2.818 (0.024)	0.788 (0.007)	-0.490 (-0.058)	0.102 (0.012)	0.638* (0.092)	-0.070 (-0.010)
Both Republican		128.949* (0.578)		102.730* (0.765)		2.191* (0.174)		1.417* (0.181)
Both Democrat		136.036* (0.888)		96.702* (0.688)		2.885* (0.335)		1.479* (0.180)
Both Women and Democrat		10.017* (0.030)		4.610* (0.013)		-0.138 (-0.007)		-0.163 (0.008)
Both Women and Republican		3.100 (0.003)		0.109 (0.000)		0.960* (0.014)		0.646* (0.023)
Both Men and Democrat		-13.165* (-0.063)		-5.925* (-0.029)		-0.333* (-0.028)		0.221 (0.018)
Both Men and Republican		-7.448* (-0.028)		-1.085* (-0.007)		0.119 (0.008)		0.850* (0.088)
# Shared Committees		-0.159 (-0.001)		0.805 (0.003)		4.362* (0.274)		3.105* (0.213)
# Years Shared Tenure		0.137 (0.002)		-0.181 (-0.003)		-0.067 (-0.014)		-0.016 (-0.004)
Same Occupation		0.617 (0.002)		1.420 (0.006)		0.275 (0.019)		0.676* (0.058)
Adjacent Districts		3.326* (0.008)		2.252* (0.007)		2.228* (0.094)		1.710* (0.088)
Minimum Activity in Pair		0.689* (0.293)		0.507* (0.382)		0.108* (0.479)		0.088* (0.382)
R ²	.01	.86	.00	.90	.02	.48	.01	.30
N	22650	22650	22650	22650	23256	23256	23256	23256

*p ≤ .05

TABLE 6

Results of QAP Regression Analyses Predicting Shared Legislative Decisions
in the Maine Senate (standardized coefficients in parentheses)

Dependent Variable	# Votes in Common				# Cosponsorships in Common			
	124	124	125	125	124	124	125	125
Intercept	302.811	-216.661	116.57	-26.098	7.481	-3.999	5.39	-1.519
Both Women	10.024 (0.003)	-9.188* (-0.032)	-11.281 (-0.018)	-31.996 (-0.050)	2.483* (0.096)	0.943* (0.037)	-1.536* (-0.065)	-0.783 (-0.033)
Both Men	-8.720 (-0.067)	-0.174 (-0.001)	-6.474 (-0.024)	17.886 (0.066)	-0.359 (-0.032)	-0.671 (-0.060)	1.316* (0.133)	-0.412 (0.042)
Both Republican		100.031* (0.600)		99.101* (0.346)		3.004* (0.210)		3.895* (0.369)
Both Democrat		126.933* (0.930)		151.589* (0.429)		4.806* (0.411)		2.730* (0.210)
Both Women and Democrat		11.291* (0.028)		15.273 (0.146)		3.447* (0.099)		0.045 (0.011)
Both Women and Republican		2.979 (0.002)		13.920 (0.007)		-4.039 (-0.030)		-1.296 (-0.018)
Both Men and Democrat		-1.835 (-0.010)		-24.966 (-0.049)		-0.788 (-0.052)		2.679* (0.142)
Both Men and Republican		5.536 (0.029)		-7.659 (-0.024)		0.594 (0.037)		0.316 (0.027)
# Shared Committees		-0.678 (-0.004)		8.288 (0.022)		4.263* (0.259)		2.726* (0.198)
# Years Shared Tenure		-1.042 (-0.016)		-6.633 (-0.085)		-0.145 (0.026)		-0.015 (-0.005)
Same Occupation		3.506 (0.017)		26.520 (0.066)		1.672* (0.094)		0.116 (0.008)
Adjacent Districts		2.748 (0.014)		8.453 (0.021)		2.123* (0.128)		1.364* (0.092)
Minimum Activity in Pair		1.150* (0.244)		0.525* (0.565)		0.122* (0.492)		0.092* (0.377)
R ²	.01	.95	.01	.52	.01	.60	.03	.43
N	1190	1190	1190	1190	1190	1190	1190	1190

*p ≤ .05

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